Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Entry
We show how costless, nonbinding, nonverifiable communication (cheap talk) can achieve partial coordination among potential entrants into a natural-monopoly industry, where the payoffs are qualitatively like the "battle of the sexes." The analysis would apply equally in other economic situations with such payoffs, for example, bargaining under complete information or choosing compatibility standards. While cheap talk helps achieve asymmetric coordination in a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium, it cannot achieve complete coordination if the game involves even a small amount of conflict.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 18 (1987)
Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.rje.org|
|Order Information:||Web: https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/rje_online.cgi|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:18:y:1987:i:spring:p:34-39. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.