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A Survey of Experiments on Communication via Cheap Talk

  • Crawford, Vincent

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ3-45J5B90-3D/2/4922438b1930ee45a0d3bcf192b1c842
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 78 (1998)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
Pages: 286-298

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:78:y:1998:i:2:p:286-298
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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  1. Joseph Farrell., 1986. "Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games," Economics Working Papers 8609, University of California at Berkeley.
  2. Blume, A. & Kim, Y.G. & Sobel, J., 1993. "Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication," Working Papers 93-07, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
  3. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-51, November.
  4. Blume, A., 1991. "Equilibrium Refinement in Sender-Receiver Games," Working Papers 91-28, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
  5. Crawford, Vincent P, 1990. "Explicit Communication and Bargaining Outcomes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 213-19, May.
  6. Cho, In-Koo & Kreps, David M, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221, May.
  7. Palfrey, Thomas R. & Rosenthal, Howard, 1991. "Testing for effects of cheap talk in a public goods game with private information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 183-220, May.
  8. Rabin, Matthew, 1990. "Communication between rational agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 144-170, June.
  9. Farrell, Joseph, 1995. "Talk Is Cheap," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 186-90, May.
  10. Cooper, Russell, et al, 1992. "Communication in Coordination Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(2), pages 739-71, May.
  11. Russell Cooper & Douglas V. DeJong & Robert Forsythe & Thomas W. Ross, 1989. "Communication in the Battle of the Sexes Game: Some Experimental Results," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(4), pages 568-587, Winter.
  12. Van Huyck, John B. & Gillette, Ann B. & Battalio, Raymond C., 1992. "Credible assignments in coordination games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 606-626, October.
  13. Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April.
  14. Farrell, Joseph, 1988. "Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 209-214.
  15. Joseph Farrell & Matthew Rabin, 1996. "Cheap Talk," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 103-118, Summer.
  16. Joseph Farrell, 1987. "Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Entry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(1), pages 34-39, Spring.
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  1. Strategic Interaction: Signaling/Cheap Talk

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