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The expert problem: a survey

  • Irene Valsecchi

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    The survey is focused on the typical problems in information transmission from experts to non-experts. Attention is paid to the factors that can affect information disclosure in models that apply a game-theoretic approach to the use of professional advice. In the economic literature expertise is mainly analyzed as a special case of asymmetric information between expert and non-expert. The contributions are reviewed according to a double criterion, that takes into account both the preferences of the experts and the properties of communication. On one side, either the non-expert plays the role of a decision-maker, who chooses an action that is payoff-relevant for the expert, or the preferences of the expert directly depend on some measure of his reputation as a high-ability forecaster. On the other side, communication can range from pure cheap talk to completely verifiable messages. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10101-013-0129-y
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    Article provided by Springer in its journal Economics of Governance.

    Volume (Year): 14 (2013)
    Issue (Month): 4 (November)
    Pages: 303-331

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    Handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:14:y:2013:i:4:p:303-331
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