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Credulity, lies, and costly talk

Listed author(s):
  • Kartik, Navin
  • Ottaviani, Marco
  • Squintani, Francesco

No abstract is available for this item.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022-0531(06)00074-3
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 134 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (May)
Pages: 93-116

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:134:y:2007:i:1:p:93-116
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1991. "Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 236-260, April.
  2. B. Douglas Bernheim & Sergei Severinov, 2003. "Bequests as Signals: An Explanation for the Equal Division Puzzle," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(4), pages 733-764, August.
  3. Roland Benabou & Guy Laroque, 1992. "Using Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 107(3), pages 921-958.
  4. Jordi Blanes, 2003. "Credibility and Cheap Talk of Securities Analysts:Theory and Evidence," FMG Discussion Papers dp472, Financial Markets Group.
  5. David Ettinger & Philippe Jehiel, 2004. "Towards a Theory of Deception," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000247, UCLA Department of Economics.
  6. Farrell Joseph, 1993. "Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 514-531, October.
  7. Olszewski, Wojciech, 2004. "Informal communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 117(2), pages 180-200, August.
  8. Vincent P. Crawford, 2003. "Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 133-149, March.
  9. Mailath, George J, 1987. "Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1349-1365, November.
  10. Marco Ottaviani & Francesco Squintani, 2006. "Naive audience and communication bias," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(1), pages 129-150, December.
  11. Terence Lim, 2001. "Rationality and Analysts' Forecast Bias," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 56(1), pages 369-385, 02.
  12. Navin Kartik, 2005. "Information Transmission with Cheap and Almost-Cheap Talk," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 666156000000000650, www.najecon.org.
  13. Morgan, John & Stocken, Phillip C, 2003. " An Analysis of Stock Recommendations," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(1), pages 183-203, Spring.
  14. Andrew R. Jackson, 2005. "Trade Generation, Reputation, and Sell-Side Analysts," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(2), pages 673-717, 04.
  15. Michaely, Roni & Womack, Kent L, 1999. "Conflict of Interest and the Credibility of Underwriter Analyst Recommendations," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 12(4), pages 653-686.
  16. Joel Sobel, 1985. "A Theory of Credibility," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(4), pages 557-573.
  17. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
  18. Manelli, Alejandro M, 1996. "Cheap Talk and Sequential Equilibria in Signaling Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(4), pages 917-942, July.
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