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Do Corporate Disclosures Constrain Strategic Analyst Behavior?

Author

Listed:
  • Yen-Cheng Chang
  • Alexander Ljungqvist
  • Kevin Tseng

Abstract

We show that analyst behavior changes in response to a randomly assigned shock that exogenously varies the timeliness and cost of accessing mandatory disclosures in the cross-section of investors: analysts reduce coverage and issue less optimistic, more accurate, less bold, and less informative forecasts. Our evidence indicates that analysts reduce a strategic component of their behavior: the changes are stronger among analysts with more strategic incentives like affiliated or retail-focused analysts. We conclude that mandatory disclosure can substitute for analyst information production, which is constrained by investors’ ability to verify forecasts using corporate filings.Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Suggested Citation

  • Yen-Cheng Chang & Alexander Ljungqvist & Kevin Tseng, 2023. "Do Corporate Disclosures Constrain Strategic Analyst Behavior?," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 36(8), pages 3163-3212.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:36:y:2023:i:8:p:3163-3212.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rfs/hhad008
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    Cited by:

    1. Xu, Jing & Wu, Wei & Feng, Xuan, 2025. "The impact of ESG performances on analyst report readability: Evidence from China," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
    2. Garman, Amy D. & Kubick, Thomas R., 2025. "Mitigating risk-shifting in corporate pension plans: Evidence from stakeholder constituency statutes," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(1).
    3. Chen, Peter F. & Hou, Qingchuan & Wang, Yihong & Xu, Lifang, 2024. "The underwriter's conflict of interest and earnings forecast bias in prospectus: Evidence from Hong Kong," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
    4. Itay Goldstein & Shijie Yang & Luo Zuo, 2020. "The Real Effects of Modern Information Technologies: Evidence from the EDGAR Implementation," NBER Working Papers 27529, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Wolfgang Breuer & Andreas Knetsch, 2023. "Recent trends in the digitalization of finance and accounting," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, vol. 93(9), pages 1451-1461, November.
    6. Chen, Yangfa & Jiang, Ji & Liu, Jie & Liu, Xiao & Wu, Weili, 2025. "Registration system reform, information environment, and market manipulation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
    7. Yang Li & Yingchun Zhang & Rui Ma & Ruixuan Wang, 2024. "Analyst optimism, information disclosure, and stock price collapse risk: Empirical insights from China’s A-share market," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 19(3), pages 1-28, March.
    8. Chin Sok Fun & Nor Shaipah Abdul Wahab & Tye Wei Ling & Premagowrie Sivanandan & Nurliyana Haji Khalid, 2023. "Tenure of independent directors and analysts following: Moderating role of institutional ownership," Cogent Business & Management, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(3), pages 2256500-225, December.
    9. Wang, Qilin & Huang, Yehua & Zhao, Mengyao & Liu, Jinzhao, 2024. "Do natural disasters hinder analysts’ information production of non-affected firms?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 234(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G29 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Other
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting
    • M48 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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