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Optimal Use Of Communication Resources

  • Olivier Gossner

    ()

    (Paris-Jourdan Sciences Économiques)

  • Abraham Neyman

    (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

  • Penélope Hernández

    (Universidad de Alicante)

We study a repeated game with asymmetric information about a dynamic state of nature. In the course of the game, the better informed player can communicate some or all of his information with the other. Our model covers costly and/or bounded communication. We characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs, and contrast these with the communication equilibrium payoffs, which by definition entail no communication costs.

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File URL: http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-2005-06.pdf
File Function: Fisrt version / Primera version, 2005
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Paper provided by Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) in its series Working Papers. Serie AD with number 2005-06.

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Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2005
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published by Ivie
Handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2005-06
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  1. Forges, Francoise M, 1986. "An Approach to Communication Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(6), pages 1375-85, November.
  2. Dino Gerardi, 2002. "Unmediated Communication in Games with Complete and Incomplete Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1371, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  3. Roger B. Myerson, 1984. "Multistage Games with Communication," Discussion Papers 590, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  4. Ben-Porath, Elchanan, 2003. "Cheap talk in games with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 45-71, January.
  5. V.D. Divekar, 1972. "Communication," The Indian Economic & Social History Review, , vol. 9(2), pages 235-238, June.
  6. Arrow, Kenneth J, 1985. "Informational Structure of the Firm," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(2), pages 303-07, May.
  7. Radner, Roy, 1993. "The Organization of Decentralized Information Processing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1109-46, September.
  8. Forges, F., 1987. "Universal mechanisms," CORE Discussion Papers 1987004, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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