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Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information

Author

Listed:
  • Heller, Yuval
  • Solan, Eilon
  • Tomala, Tristan

Abstract

This paper studies extensive form games with public information where all players have the same information at each point in time. We prove that when there are at least three players, all communication equilibrium payoffs can be obtained by unmediated cheap-talk procedures. The result encompasses repeated games and stochastic games.

Suggested Citation

  • Heller, Yuval & Solan, Eilon & Tomala, Tristan, 2012. "Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 222-234.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:74:y:2012:i:1:p:222-234
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dubey, Pradeep & Kaneko, Mamoru, 1985. "Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games -- II," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 247-262, December.
    2. Ben-Porath, Elchanan, 1998. "Correlation without Mediation: Expanding the Set of Equilibrium Outcomes by "Cheap" Pre-play Procedures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 108-122, May.
    3. Joseph Farrell & Matthew Rabin, 1996. "Cheap Talk," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 103-118, Summer.
    4. Amparo Urbano & Jose E. Vila, 2002. "Computational Complexity and Communication: Coordination in Two-Player Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(5), pages 1893-1927, September.
    5. Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2002. "Correlated Equilibrium in Stochastic Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 362-399, February.
    6. Ben-Porath, Elchanan, 2003. "Cheap talk in games with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 45-71, January.
    7. Heller, Yuval, 2010. "Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 394-400, July.
    8. Forges, Francoise, 1990. "Universal Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1341-1364, November.
    9. Aumann, Robert J., 1974. "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 67-96, March.
    10. Eilon Solan, 2001. "Characterization of correlated equilibria in stochastic games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 30(2), pages 259-277.
    11. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, January.
    12. repec:dau:papers:123456789/6103 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Gerardi, Dino, 2004. "Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 104-131, January.
    14. repec:dau:papers:123456789/6019 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Dubey, Pradeep & Kaneko, Mamoru, 1984. "Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games: 1," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 111-139, October.
    16. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
    17. Forges, Francoise M, 1986. "An Approach to Communication Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(6), pages 1375-1385, November.
    18. Renault, Jerome & Tomala, Tristan, 2004. "Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 313-344, November.
    19. Myerson, Roger B, 1986. "Multistage Games with Communication," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(2), pages 323-358, March.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. John Hillas & Min Liu, 2016. "Correlated equilibria of two person repeated games with random signals," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 45(1), pages 137-153, March.
    2. Forges, Françoise & Vida, Péter, 2013. "Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(1), January.
    3. repec:spr:jogath:v:46:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s00182-017-0569-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Sugaya, Takuo & Wolitzky, Alexander, 2017. "Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cheap-talk; Communication equilibrium; Normal-form correlated equilibrium; Distributed computation;

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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