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Characterization of correlated equilibria in stochastic games

Author

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  • Eilon Solan

    () (Department of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, and the School of Mathematical Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel. Final version July 2001)

Abstract

A general communication device is a device that at every stage of the game receives a private message from each player, and in return sends a private signal to each player; the signals the device sends depend on past play, past signals it sent, and past messages it received. An autonomous correlation device is a general communication device where signals depend only on past signals the device sent, but not on past play or past messages it received. We show that the set of all equilibrium payoffs in extended games that include a general communication device coincides with the set of all equilibrium payoffs in extended games that include an autonomous correlation device. A stronger result is obtained when the punishment level is independent of the history.

Suggested Citation

  • Eilon Solan, 2001. "Characterization of correlated equilibria in stochastic games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 30(2), pages 259-277.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:30:y:2001:i:2:p:259-277
    Note: received. An autonomous correlation device is a general communication device where signals depend only on past signals the device sent, but not on past play or past messages it received. We show that the set of all equilibrium payoffs in extended games that include a general communication device coincides with the set of all equilibrium payoffs in extended games that include an autonomous correlation device. A stronger result is obtained when the punishment level is independent of the history.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ramsey, David M. & Szajowski, Krzysztof, 2008. "Selection of a correlated equilibrium in Markov stopping games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 184(1), pages 185-206, January.
    2. John Hillas & Min Liu, 2016. "Correlated equilibria of two person repeated games with random signals," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 45(1), pages 137-153, March.
    3. Ayala Mashiah-Yaakovi, 2015. "Correlated Equilibria in Stochastic Games with Borel Measurable Payoffs," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 120-135, March.
    4. Ramsey, David M. & Szajowski, Krzysztof, 2004. "Correlated equilibria in competitive staff selection problem," MPRA Paper 19870, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2006.
    5. repec:spr:jogath:v:46:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s00182-017-0569-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. F. Forges & B. von Stengel, 2002. "Computionally Efficient Coordination in Games Trees," THEMA Working Papers 2002-05, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    7. Heller, Yuval & Solan, Eilon & Tomala, Tristan, 2012. "Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 222-234.

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