Correlated equilibria in competitive staff selection problem
This paper deals with an extension of the concept of correlated strategies to Markov stopping games. The idea of this paper was presented at Game Theory and Mathematical Economics, International Conference in Memory of Jerzy Łoś (1920 - 1998), Warsaw, September 2004. The Nash equilibrium approach to solving nonzero-sum stopping games may give multiple solutions. An arbitrator can suggest to each player the decision to be applied at each stage based on a joint distribution over the players' decisions. This is a form of equilibrium selection. Examples of correlated equilibria in nonzero-sum games related to the staff selection competition in the case of two departments are given. Utilitarian, egalitarian, republican and libertarian concepts of correlated equilibria selection are used.
|Date of creation:||Sep 2004|
|Date of revision:||2006|
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