Extensive form correlated equilibrium: definition and computational complexity
This paper defines the extensive-form correlated equilibrium (EFCE) for extensive games with perfect recall. The EFCE concept extends Aumann's strategic-form correlated equilibrium (CE). Before the game starts, a correlation device generates a move for each information set. This move is recommended to the player only when the player reaches the information set. In two-player perfect-recall extensive games without chance moves, the set of EFCE can be described by a polynomial number of consistency and incentive constraints. Assuming P is not equal to NP, this is not possible for the set of CE, or if the game has chance moves.
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|Date of creation:||2008|
|Publication status:||Published in Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, 2008, 33, pp.1002-1022. <10.1287/moor.1080.0340>|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00360729|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
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