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Francoise Forges

Personal Details

First Name:Francoise
Middle Name:
Last Name:Forges
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pfo80
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
http://sites.google.com/site/francoiseforges/
Terminal Degree:1984 École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain; Louvain Institute of Data Analysis and Modelling in Economics and Statistics (LIDAM); Université Catholique de Louvain (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

(50%) Centre de Recherches en Mathématiques de la Décision (CEREMADE)
Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX)

Paris, France
http://www.ceremade.dauphine.fr/
RePEc:edi:cerp9fr (more details at EDIRC)

(50%) Laboratoire d'Économie de Dauphine (LEDa)
Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX)

Paris, France
http://leda.dauphine.fr/
RePEc:edi:ledaufr (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles Chapters Books

Working papers

  1. Françoise Forges, 2019. "Games with incomplete information: from repetition to cheap talk and persuasion," Post-Print hal-02315317, HAL.
  2. Forges, Françoise & Horst, Ulrich, 2017. "Sender-Receiver Games with Cooperation," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 17, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
  3. Françoise Forges, 2017. "Coopération en information incomplète: quelques modèles stratégiques," Post-Print hal-02315008, HAL.
  4. Eliaz Kfir & Francoise Forges, 2015. "Information disclosure to Cournot duopolists," Post-Print hal-01252926, HAL.
  5. Enrico Minelli & Françoise Forges, 2014. "Corrigendum to “Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations”," Post-Print hal-01519845, HAL.
  6. Francoise Forges & Ulrich Horst & Antoine Salomon, 2014. "Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games," Working Papers hal-01094061, HAL.
  7. Francoise Forges & Antoine Salomon, 2014. "Bayesian repeated games and reputation," Working Papers hal-00803919, HAL.
  8. Françoise Forges & Johannes Horner, 2013. "Games and Incentives," Post-Print hal-02455043, HAL.
  9. Francoise Forges & Guillaume Haeringer & Vincent Iehlé, 2013. "Appariement: des modèles de Lloyd Shapley à la conception de marchés d'Alvin Roth," Post-Print hal-00822561, HAL.
  10. FORGES, Françoise, 2013. "J.-F. Mertens (1946-2012): des jeux répétés à l'analyse "coût-bénéfice"," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2563, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  11. Francoise Forges, 2013. "A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment," Post-Print hal-01252953, HAL.
  12. Francoise Forges & Vincent Iehlé, 2013. "Afriat's Theorem for Indivisible Goods," CESifo Working Paper Series 4498, CESifo.
  13. Françoise Forges, 2012. "Folk theorems for Bayesian (public good) games," Post-Print hal-02447604, HAL.
  14. Forges, Françoise & Iehlé, Vincent, 2012. "Essential Data, Budget Sets and Rationalization," MPRA Paper 36519, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  15. Péter Vida & Francoise Forges, 2011. "Implementation of Communication Equilibria by Correlated Cheap Talk: The Two-Player Case," CESifo Working Paper Series 3360, CESifo.
  16. Françoise Forges & Roberto Serrano, 2011. "Cooperative games with incomplete information: Some open problems," Working Papers 2011-14, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
  17. Françoise Forges & Ram Orzach, 2010. "Core-stable Rings in Second Price Auctions with Common Values," Working Papers 2010.119, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  18. Omer Biran & Francoise Forges, 2010. "Core-stable Rings in Auctions with Independent Private Values," CESifo Working Paper Series 3067, CESifo.
  19. Francoise Forges & Enrico Minelli, 2009. "Afriat's theorem for generalized budget sets," Post-Print hal-00360726, HAL.
  20. Francoise Forges & Frédéric Koessler, 2008. "Transmission stratégique de l'information et certification," Post-Print hal-00360746, HAL.
  21. Francoise Forges & Bernhard von Stengel, 2008. "Extensive form correlated equilibrium: definition and computational complexity," Post-Print hal-00360729, HAL.
  22. Francoise Forges, 2007. "Leonid Hurwicz, Eric Maskin, Roger Myerson et la théorie des mécanismes," Post-Print hal-02276813, HAL.
  23. Francoise Forges & Riham Barbar, 2007. "Collusion dans les enchères: quelques apports de jeux coopératifs," Post-Print hal-00360742, HAL.
  24. Frederic Koessler & Francoise Forges, 2006. "Transmission stratégique de l'information et certification (Strategic Information Transmission and Certification)," THEMA Working Papers 2006-04, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  25. FORGES, Françoise, 2006. "Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2006041, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  26. Frederic Koessler & Francoise Forges, 2006. "Multistage communication with and without verifiable types," THEMA Working Papers 2006-14, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  27. Francoise Forges, 2006. "Feasible mechanisms in economies with type-dependent endowments," Post-Print hal-00360744, HAL.
  28. Francoise Forges, 2006. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in Exchange Economies with and without Indivisibilities," CESifo Working Paper Series 1686, CESifo.
  29. Francoise Forges & Frédéric Koessler, 2006. "Long Persuasion Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 1669, CESifo.
  30. Francoise Forges & Enrico Minelli, 2006. "Afriat’s Theorem for General Budget Sets," CESifo Working Paper Series 1703, CESifo.
  31. F. Forges & Frederic Koessler, 2003. "Communication Equilibria with Partially Verifiable Types," THEMA Working Papers 2003-10, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  32. F. Forges & B. von Stengel, 2002. "Computionally Efficient Coordination in Games Trees," THEMA Working Papers 2002-05, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  33. F. Forges, 2002. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core of the Assignment Game," THEMA Working Papers 2002-07, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  34. Francoise Forges & Jean-Francois Mertens & Rajiv Vohra, 2001. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the absence of wealth effects," Working Papers 2001-01, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  35. Francoise Forges & Enrico Minelli & Rajiv Vohra, 2000. "Incentives and the Core of an Exchange Economy: A Survey," Working Papers 2000-22, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  36. F. Forges & J. F. Mertens & R. Vohra, 2000. "The Incentive Compatible Core of a Quasi-Linear Economy," THEMA Working Papers 2000-34, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  37. F. Forges & E. Minelli, 1999. "A note on the incentive compatible core," THEMA Working Papers 99-02, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  38. Forges, F. & Heifetz, A. & Minelli, E., 1999. "Incentive Compatible Core and Competitive Equilibria in Differential Information Economics," Papers 99-06, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
  39. Forges, F., 1998. "Ex Post Individually Rational Trading Mechanisms," Papers 9810, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
  40. Forges, F., 1998. "Le coeur d'une economie d'echange en information asymetrique," Papers 9829, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
  41. Forges, F. & Minelli, E., 1996. "Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games," Papers 9624, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
  42. Forges, F. & Minelli, E., 1996. "Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations," Papers 9605, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
  43. O. De Wolf & F. Forges, 1996. "Rational Choice in Strategic Environments : Further Observations," THEMA Working Papers 96-23, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  44. DE WOLF , Olivier & FORGES , Françoise, 1995. "On Strategic Equilibria and Rational Choice," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1995048, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  45. Françoise FORGES, 1995. "Différences d’information, solutions concurentielles et stratégies révélatrices," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 1995014, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
  46. Forges,F. & Minelli,E., 1995. "Property of Nash Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Papers 9518, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
  47. FORGES, Françoise & MINELLI , Enrico, 1994. "Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1994058, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  48. FORGES , Françoise, 1993. "A Note on Pareto Optimality in Differential Information Economies," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1993043, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  49. FORGES , Françoise, 1993. "Five Legitimate Definitions of Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1993009, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  50. Forges, F., 1991. "Correlated equilibrium and sunspot equilibrium," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1991053, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  51. Forges, F., 1991. "Posterior efficiency," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1991045, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  52. Francoise Forges, 1990. "Trading Games With Asymmetric Information," Discussion Papers 880, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  53. FORGES, Françoise, 1990. "Sunspot equilibrium as a game-theoretical solution concept," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1990029, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  54. Forges, F., 1990. "Some Thoughts on Efficiency and Information," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1990071, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  55. FORGES, Françoise, 1990. "Repeated games with incomplete information," LIDAM Reprints CORE 933, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  56. FORGES, Françoise, 1990. "Equilibria with communication in a job market example," LIDAM Reprints CORE 885, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  57. FORGES, Françoise, 1990. "Correlated equilibrium in two-person zero-sum games," LIDAM Reprints CORE 883, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  58. FORGES, Françoise, 1988. "Repeated games of incomplete information: non-zero-sum," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1988005, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  59. FORGES, Françoise, 1988. "Communication equilibria in repeated games with incomplete information," LIDAM Reprints CORE 809, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  60. FORGES, Françoise, 1988. "Infinitely repeated games with incomplete information," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1988006, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  61. FORGES, Françoise, 1988. "Non-zero sum repeated games and information transmission," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1988025, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  62. Forges, F., 1987. "Universal mechanisms," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1987004, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  63. Forges, F., 1987. "Can sunspots replace a mediator ?," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1987045, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  64. Forges, F., 1986. "Negotiation without a deadline:a job market example," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1986039, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  65. FORGES, Françoise, 1986. "Correlated equilibria in repeated games with lack of information on one side: a model with verifiable types," LIDAM Reprints CORE 700, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  66. Forges, F. & Mertens, J.F. & Neyman, A., 1986. "A counterexample to the folk theorem with discounting," LIDAM Reprints CORE 673, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  67. FORGES, Françoise, 1985. "Correlated equilibria in a class of repeated games with incomplete information," LIDAM Reprints CORE 663, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  68. Forges, F., 1984. "Communication devices in repeated games with incomplete information (Part 3)," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1984012, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  69. Forges, F., 1984. "Communication devices in repeated games with incomplete information (Part 2)," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1984011, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  70. Forges, F., 1984. "Note on Nash equilibria in infinitely repeated games with incomplete information," LIDAM Reprints CORE 573, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  71. Forges, F., 1984. "An approach to communication equilibria," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1984035, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  72. Forges, F., 1984. "Communication devices in repeated games with incomplete information (Part 1)," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1984006, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  73. FORGES, Françoise, 1982. "Infinitely repeated games of incomplete information: symmetric case with random signals," LIDAM Reprints CORE 503, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

Articles

  1. Françoise Forges, 2020. "Games with Incomplete Information: From Repetition to Cheap Talk and Persuasion," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 137, pages 3-30.
  2. Forges, Françoise & Horst, Ulrich, 2018. "Sender–receiver games with cooperation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 52-61.
  3. Françoise Forges, 2017. "Coopération en information incomplète : quelques modèles stratégiques," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 127(4), pages 467-493.
  4. Françoise Forges & Ulrich Horst & Antoine Salomon, 2016. "Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 45(1), pages 11-36, March.
  5. Salomon, Antoine & Forges, Françoise, 2015. "Bayesian repeated games and reputation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 70-104.
  6. Eliaz, Kfir & Forges, Françoise, 2015. "Information disclosure to Cournot duopolists," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 167-170.
  7. Forges, Françoise & Iehlé, Vincent, 2014. "Afriat’s theorem for indivisible goods," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 1-6.
  8. Forges, Françoise, 2014. "Interview With Jean-François Mertens (1946–2012)," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(8), pages 1832-1853, December.
  9. Françoise Forges & Guillaume Haeringer & Vincent Iehlé, 2013. "Appariement : des modèles de Lloyd Shapley à la conception de marchés d'Alvin Roth," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 123(5), pages 663-696.
  10. Françoise Forges & Roberto Serrano, 2013. "Cooperative Games With Incomplete Information: Some Open Problems," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 15(02), pages 1-17.
  11. Forges, Françoise, 2013. "A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 64-71.
  12. Françoise Forges & Vincent Iehlé, 2013. "Essential data, budget sets and rationalization," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 54(3), pages 449-461, November.
  13. , & ,, 2013. "Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(1), January.
  14. Françoise Forges, 2012. "J.-F. Mertens (1946-2012) : des jeux répétés à l'analyse « coût-bénéfice »," Revue française d'économie, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(3), pages 19-34.
  15. Forges, Françoise & Orzach, Ram, 2011. "Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(6), pages 760-767.
  16. Biran, Omer & Forges, Françoise, 2011. "Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 52-64, September.
  17. Forges, Françoise & Minelli, Enrico, 2009. "Afriat's theorem for general budget sets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 135-145, January.
  18. Frédéric Koessler & Françoise Forges, 2008. "Transmission stratégique de l'information et certification," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 89, pages 3-61.
  19. Forges, Françoise & Koessler, Frédéric, 2008. "Long persuasion games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 1-35, November.
  20. Frédéric Koessler & Françoise Forges, 2008. "Multistage Communication With And Without Verifiable Types," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 10(02), pages 145-164.
  21. Riham Barbar & Françoise Forges, 2007. "Collusion dans les enchères. Quelques apports des jeux coopératifs," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 58(5), pages 965-984.
  22. Françoise Forges, 2007. "Leonid Hurwicz, Eric Maskin, Roger Myerson et la Théorie des Mécanismes," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 117(6), pages 873-890.
  23. Françoise Forges, 2006. "Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information Revisited," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 61(4), pages 329-344, December.
  24. Françoise Forges, 2006. "Feasible Mechanisms in Economies with Type-Dependent Endowments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(2), pages 403-419, April.
  25. Forges, Francoise & Koessler, Frederic, 2005. "Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(7), pages 793-811, November.
  26. Forges, Francoise, 2004. "The ex ante incentive compatible core of the assignment game," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 135-151, March.
  27. Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico & Vohra, Rajiv, 2002. "Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1-2), pages 1-41, September.
  28. Francoise Forges & Jean-Francois Mertens & Rajiv Vohra, 2002. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(5), pages 1865-1892, September.
  29. Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico, 2001. "A Note on the Incentive Compatible Core," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 179-188, May.
  30. Aviad Heifetz & Françoise Forges & Enrico Minelli, 2001. "Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 18(2), pages 349-365.
  31. Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico, 1998. "Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 292-310, November.
  32. Olivier De Wolf & Françoise Forges, 1998. "Rational Choice in Strategic Environments: Further Observations," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 100(2), pages 529-535, June.
  33. Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico, 1997. "A Property of Nash Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 159-175, February.
  34. Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico, 1997. "Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 388-406, August.
  35. Forges, Francoise & Peck, James, 1995. "Correlated Equilibrium and Sunspot Equilibrium," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(1), pages 33-50, January.
  36. Forges, Francoise, 1994. "A note on Pareto optimality in differential information economies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 27-31, September.
  37. Forges Francoise, 1994. "Posterior Efficiency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 238-261, March.
  38. Forges, Francoise, 1990. "Correlated Equilibrium in Two-Person Zero-Sum Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(2), pages 515-515, March.
  39. Forges, Francoise, 1990. "Universal Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1341-1364, November.
  40. Françoise Forges, 1990. "Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 105(2), pages 375-398.
  41. Forges, Francoise, 1988. "Can sunspots replace a mediator?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 347-368, September.
  42. Forges, F. & Mertens, J. F. & Neyman, A., 1986. "A counterexample to the folk theorem with discounting," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 7-7.
  43. Forges, Francoise M, 1986. "An Approach to Communication Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(6), pages 1375-1385, November.

    RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:33:y:2008:i:4:p:1002-1022 is not listed on IDEAS
    RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:13:y:1988:i:2:p:191-231 is not listed on IDEAS

Chapters

  1. Forges, Francoise, 1992. "Repeated games of incomplete information: Non-zero-sum," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 155-177, Elsevier.

Books

  1. Biran, Omer, 2011. "Mécanismes d'échange en présence d'externalités," Economics Thesis from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University, number 123456789/7238 edited by Forges, Françoise.

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 18 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (11) 2006-04-08 2006-04-08 2006-05-06 2006-06-03 2010-11-06 2011-09-16 2012-01-25 2014-01-24 2015-08-25 2017-04-30 2019-10-28. Author is listed
  2. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (10) 2006-06-03 2011-09-16 2012-01-25 2012-02-20 2013-04-06 2014-01-24 2014-11-01 2015-08-25 2017-04-30 2019-10-28. Author is listed
  3. NEP-HPE: History and Philosophy of Economics (7) 2010-11-06 2011-09-16 2012-01-25 2013-04-06 2014-01-24 2015-08-25 2017-04-30. Author is listed
  4. NEP-UPT: Utility Models and Prospect Theory (7) 2006-04-08 2006-04-22 2006-06-03 2006-09-30 2012-02-20 2014-01-24 2014-11-01. Author is listed
  5. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (4) 2010-11-06 2011-09-16 2012-01-25 2013-04-06
  6. NEP-CBA: Central Banking (1) 2010-12-18

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