IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

Information disclosure to Cournot duopolists

Listed author(s):
  • Eliaz, Kfir
  • Forges, Françoise

We show that in a standard symmetric Cournot duopoly with unknown demand, the optimal information disclosure policy of an informed benevolent planner is to fully inform one of the duopolists and disclose no information to the other one. We discuss possible extensions of the result.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 126 (2015)
Issue (Month): C ()
Pages: 167-170

in new window

Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:126:y:2015:i:c:p:167-170
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.12.006
Contact details of provider: Web page:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

in new window

  1. Paul R. Milgrom, 1981. "Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 380-391, Autumn.
  2. Moreno, Diego & Shitovitz, Benyamin & Haimanko, Ori & Einy, Ezra, 2007. "On the existence of Bayesian Cournot equilibrium," UC3M Working papers. Economics we070603, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
  3. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2012. "Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000331, David K. Levine.
  4. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez‐Richet, 2014. "Certifiable Pre‐Play Communication: Full Disclosure," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(3), pages 1093-1131, 05.
  5. Kfir Eliaz & Roberto Serrano, 2010. "Sending Information to Interactive Receivers Playing a Generalized Prisoners Dilemma," Working Papers 2010-16, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  6. Shitovitz, Benyamin & Sela, A. & Moreno, Diego & Haimanko, Ori & Einy, Ezra, 2013. "Tullock contests with asymmetric information," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1314, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
  7. Wärneryd, Karl, 2000. "Information in Conflicts," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 388, Stockholm School of Economics.
  8. repec:cwl:cwldpp:1821rrr is not listed on IDEAS
  9. Ilan Kremer & Yishay Mansour & Motty Perry, 2014. "Implementing the "Wisdom of the Crowd"," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 122(5), pages 988-1012.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:126:y:2015:i:c:p:167-170. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.