IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/jogath/v43y2014i2p245-267.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Sending information to interactive receivers playing a generalized prisoners’ dilemma

Author

Listed:
  • Kfir Eliaz

    ()

  • Roberto Serrano

    ()

Abstract

Consider the problem of information disclosure for a planner who faces two agents interacting in a state-dependent multi-action prisoners’ dilemma. We find conditions under which the planner can make use of his superior information by disclosing some of it to the agents, and conditions under which such information leakage is not possible. Although the problem is entirely symmetric, the planner’s only way to reveal part of the information is based on creating asymmetries between the two agents by giving them different pieces of information. We also find conditions under which such partially informative equilibria are the planner’s best equilibria. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Suggested Citation

  • Kfir Eliaz & Roberto Serrano, 2014. "Sending information to interactive receivers playing a generalized prisoners’ dilemma," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(2), pages 245-267, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:43:y:2014:i:2:p:245-267 DOI: 10.1007/s00182-013-0374-x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00182-013-0374-x
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Max Gillman, 2012. "AS-AD in the Standard Dynamic Neoclassical Model: Business Cycles and Growth Trends," IEHAS Discussion Papers 1222, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
    2. James B. Davies & Martin G. Kocher & Matthias Sutter, 2008. "Economics research in Canada: a long-run assessment of journal publications," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, pages 22-45.
    3. Johannes Hörner & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2016. "Selling Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, pages 1515-1562.
    4. repec:hoo:wpaper:e-89-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Goltsman, Maria & Pavlov, Gregory, 2011. "How to talk to multiple audiences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 100-122, May.
    6. Baliga, Sandeep & Sjostrom, Tomas, 1999. "Interactive Implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 38-63, April.
    7. Helmuts Āzacis & Péter Vida, 2015. "Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), pages 125-160.
    8. Luis Rayo & Ilya Segal, 2010. "Optimal Information Disclosure," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 118(5), pages 949-987.
    9. Siew Hong Teoh, 1997. "Information Disclosure and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 385-406.
    10. Baliga, Sandeep & Corchon, Luis C. & Sjostrom, Tomas, 1997. "The Theory of Implementation When the Planner Is a Player," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 15-33.
    11. McAfee, R Preston & Schwartz, Marius, 1994. "Opportunism in Multilateral Vertical Contracting: Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 210-230.
    12. Matheron, Julien & Poilly, Céline, 2009. "How well does a small structural model with sticky prices and wages fit postwar U.S. data?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, pages 266-284.
    13. Koessler, Frédéric, 2008. "Lobbying with two audiences: Public vs private certification," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, pages 305-314.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Eliaz, Kfir & Forges, Françoise, 2015. "Information disclosure to Cournot duopolists," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 167-170.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Information disclosure; Generalized prisoners’ dilemma; Uninformative equilibria; Partially or fully informative equilibria; C72; D82; D83;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:43:y:2014:i:2:p:245-267. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.