Lobbying with two audiences: Public vs private certification
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.
Other versions of this item:
- Frederic Koessler, 2006. "Lobbying with Two Audiences: Public vs Private Certification," THEMA Working Papers 2006-12, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Frédéric Koessler, 2008. "Lobbying with two audiences: Public vs private certification," Post-Print halshs-00754290, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
- Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara & Andrew Postlewaite & Kotaro Suzumura, 1990. "Strategic Information Revelation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 57(1), pages 25-47.
- Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-894, July.
- Robert Gertner & Robert Gibbons & David Scharfstein, 1988.
"Simultaneous Signalling to the Capital and Product Markets,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(2), pages 173-190, Summer.
- Robert Gertner & Robert Gibbons & David Scharfstein, 1987. "Simultaneous Signaling to the Capital and Product Markets," Working papers 449, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Gertner, Robert H. & Gibbons, Robert. & Scharfstein, David., 1987. "Simultaneous signaling to the capital and product markets," Working papers 1917-87., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
- Gilat Levy & Ronny Razin, 2004.
"It Takes Two: An Explanation for the Democratic Peace,"
Journal of the European Economic Association,
MIT Press, vol. 2(1), pages 1-29, March.
- Levy, Gilat & Razin, Ronny, 2003. "It Takes Two: An Explanation of the Democratic Peace," CEPR Discussion Papers 3947, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Levy, Gilat & Razin, Ronny, 2004. "It takes two : an explanation of the democratic peace," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 539, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, May.
- Farrell, Joseph & Gibbons, Robert, 1989. "Cheap Talk with Two Audiences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(5), pages 1214-1223, December.
- Jerry R. Green & Jean-Jacques Laffont, 1986. "Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(3), pages 447-456.
- Daniel J. Seidmann & Eyal Winter, 1997. "Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(1), pages 163-170, January.
- repec:hoo:wpaper:e-89-7 is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:dau:papers:123456789/168 is not listed on IDEAS
- Giovannoni, Francesco & Seidmann, Daniel J., 2007. "Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 296-315, May.
- Forges, Francoise & Koessler, Frederic, 2005.
"Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 41(7), pages 793-811, November.
- F. Forges & Frederic Koessler, 2003. "Communication Equilibria with Partially Verifiable Types," THEMA Working Papers 2003-10, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680.
- Verrecchia, Robert E., 2001. "Essays on disclosure," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-3), pages 97-180, December.
- repec:bla:joares:v:31:y:1993:i:1:p:92-112 is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:bla:joares:v:32:y:1994:i:2:p:224-240 is not listed on IDEAS
- Sjaak Hurkens & Karl Schlag, 2003. "Evolutionary insights on the willingness to communicate," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 31(4), pages 511-526, September.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Kfir Eliaz & Roberto Serrano, 2014.
"Sending information to interactive receivers playing a generalized prisoners’ dilemma,"
International Journal of Game Theory,
Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(2), pages 245-267, May.
- Kfir Eliaz & Roberto Serrano, 2010. "Sending Information to Interactive Receivers Playing a Generalized Prisoners Dilemma," Working Papers 2010-16, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Kfir Eliaz & Roberto Serrano, 2010. "Sending information to interactive receivers playing a generalized prisoners' dilemma," Working Papers 2010-20, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
- Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2008. "Strategic communication networks," Working Papers halshs-00586847, HAL.
- repec:the:publsh:3056 is not listed on IDEAS
- Hagenbach, Jeanne & Koessler, Frédéric, 2016. "Full disclosure in decentralized organizations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 5-7.
- Goltsman, Maria & Pavlov, Gregory, 2011. "How to talk to multiple audiences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 100-122, May.
- Burkhard Schipper & Hee Yeul Woo, 2014.
"Political Awareness, Microtargeting of Voters, and Negative Electoral Campaigning,"
148, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- Burkhard Schipper & Hee Yeul Woo, 2017. "Political Awareness, Microtargeting of Voters, and Negative Electoral Campaigning," Working Papers 173, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- Ertac, Seda & Koçkesen, Levent & Ozdemir, Duygu, 2016.
"The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: Theory and experimental evidence,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 24-45.
- Seda Ertac & Levent Kockesen & Duygu Ozdemir, 2015. "The Role of Verifiability and Privacy in the Strategic Provision of Performance Feedback: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1524, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
- Wang, Yun, 2013. "The result of world powers in WTO: A cheap-talk game under different communication protocols," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 192-207.
- Seda Ertac & Mert Gumren & Levent Kockesen, 2017. "Strategic Feedback in Teams: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1714, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
- Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2011. "Full Disclosure in Decentralized Organizations," Working Papers halshs-00652279, HAL.
More about this item
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:55:y:2008:i:3:p:305-314. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565 .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.