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Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure

Author

Listed:
  • Jeanne Hagenbach

    (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - Polytechnique - X - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Frédéric Koessler

    (PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics)

  • Eduardo Perez-Richet

    (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - Polytechnique - X - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

This article asks when communication with certifiable information leads to complete information sharing. We consider Bayesian games augmented by a pre-play communication phase in which announcements are made publicly. We characterize the augmented games in which there exists a full disclosure sequential equilibrium with extremal beliefs (i.e., any deviation is attributed to a single type of the deviator). This characterization enables us to provide different sets of sufficient conditions for full information disclosure that encompass and extend all known results in the literature, and are easily applicable. We use these conditions to obtain new insights in senders-receiver games, games with strategic complementarities, and voting with deliberation.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2012. "Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure," PSE Working Papers hal-00753473, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:psewpa:hal-00753473 Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00753473
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Miura, Shintaro, 2014. "A characterization of equilibrium set of persuasion games with binary actions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 55-68.
    2. Anton Kolotilin, 2013. "Experimental Design to Persuade," Discussion Papers 2013-17, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    3. Jean-Marc Bourgeon & Pierre Picard, 2014. "Fraudulent Claims and Nitpicky Insurers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 2900-2917.
    4. Hedlund, Jonas, 2017. "Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 229-268.
    5. Schopohl, Simon, 2016. "Communication games with optional verification," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 569, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    6. Roland Strausz, 2016. "Expected Worth for 2 × 2 Matrix Games with Variable Grid Sizes," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2040, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    7. Konrad Stahl & Roland Strausz, 2017. "Certification and Market Transparency," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, pages 1842-1868.
    8. Strausz, Roland, 2017. "Politically induced regulatory risk and independent regulatory agencies," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 215-238.
    9. Arve, Malin & Honryo, Takakazu, 2015. "Delegation and Communication," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 524, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    10. Tan, Xu, 2016. "Information revelation in auctions with common and private values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 147-165.
    11. Hagenbach, Jeanne & Koessler, Frédéric, 2016. "Full disclosure in decentralized organizations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 5-7.
    12. PRAM, Kym, 2017. "Hard evidence and welfare in adverse selection environments," Economics Working Papers MWP 2017/10, European University Institute.
    13. Matthew Gentzkow & Emir Kamenica, 2017. "Disclosure of endogenous information," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), pages 47-56.
    14. Salvador Barberà & Antonio Nicolò, 2016. "Information Disclosure under Strategy-proof Voting Rules," Working Papers 904, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
    15. Gorkem Celik & Michael Peters, 2016. "Reciprocal relationships and mechanism design," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 49(1), pages 374-411, February.
    16. Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2012. "Competing with Equivocal Information," Working Papers hal-00675126, HAL.
    17. Ertac, Seda & Koçkesen, Levent & Ozdemir, Duygu, 2016. "The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: Theory and experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 24-45.
    18. Eliaz, Kfir & Forges, Françoise, 2015. "Information disclosure to Cournot duopolists," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 167-170.
    19. Hedlund, Jonas, 2014. "Bayesian signaling," Working Papers 0577, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    20. Kose, Ayhan & Kurlat, Sergio & Ohnsorge, Franziska & Sugawara, Naotaka, 2017. "A Cross-Country Database of Fiscal Space," CEPR Discussion Papers 12196, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    21. Kolotilin, Anton, 2015. "Experimental design to persuade," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 215-226.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Strategic Communication; Hard Information; Information Disclosure; Masquerade Relation; Belief Consistency; Single Crossing Di erences; Supermodular Games;

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