Information aggregation and preference heterogeneity in committees
This paper is concerned with the efficiency of information aggregation in a committee whose members have heterogeneous preferences over a binary decision variable. In a first stage, agents may exchange private (decision-relevant) information which is assumed to be verifiable. Then they reach a decision via majority voting. We study different information environments and identify conditions under which full information aggregation is possible. In particular, if preferences are common knowledge and each committee member is endowed with information full information aggregation is possible despite preference heterogeneity.
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