IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/f/psc211.html
   My authors  Follow this author

Elisabeth Schulte

Personal Details

First Name:Elisabeth
Middle Name:
Last Name:Schulte
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:psc211
http://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/insecon
Terminal Degree: Abteilung für Volkswirtschaftslehre; Universität Mannheim (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Marburg Centre of Institutional Economics
Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Philipps-Universität Marburg

Marburg, Germany
http://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/macie
RePEc:edi:cimarde (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Matthias Verbeck & Elisabeth Schulte, 2016. "Contracting with Researchers," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201620, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  2. Elisabeth Schulte & Mike Felgenhauer, 2015. "Preselection and Expert Advice," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201524, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  3. Elisabeth Schulte, 2006. "Information Aggregation and Preference Heterogeneity in Committees," JEPS Working Papers 06-003, JEPS.
  4. Grüner, Hans Peter & Schulte, Elisabeth, 2004. "Speed and Quality of Collective Decision-Making II: Incentives for Information Provision," CEPR Discussion Papers 4397, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Grüner, Hans Peter & Schulte, Elisabeth, 2004. "Speed and Quality of Collective Decision-Making, I: Imperfect Information Processing," CEPR Discussion Papers 4179, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

Articles

  1. Boyer, Pierre C. & Koriyama, Yukio & Schulte, Elisabeth, 2016. "Legitimacy of mechanisms for public good provision," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 120-122.
  2. Mike Felgenhauer & Elisabeth Schulte, 2014. "Strategic Private Experimentation," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 74-105, November.
  3. Elisabeth Schulte, 2012. "Communication in committees: who should listen?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 97-117, January.
  4. Elisabeth Schulte, 2010. "Information aggregation and preference heterogeneity in committees," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(1), pages 97-118, July.
  5. Grüner, Hans Peter & Schulte, Elisabeth, 2010. "Speed and quality of collective decision making: Incentives for information provision," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 734-747, December.
  6. Schulte, Elisabeth & Peter Gruner, Hans, 2007. "Speed and quality of collective decision making: Imperfect information processing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 138-154, May.
  7. Gerling, Kerstin & Gruner, Hans Peter & Kiel, Alexandra & Schulte, Elisabeth, 2005. "Information acquisition and decision making in committees: A survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 563-597, September.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Elisabeth Schulte & Mike Felgenhauer, 2015. "Preselection and Expert Advice," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201524, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).

    Cited by:

    1. Liu, Yaozhou Franklin & Sanyal, Amal, 2010. "When second opinions hurt: a model of expert advice under career concerns," MPRA Paper 27176, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. David Card & Stefano DellaVigna, 2017. "What do Editors Maximize? Evidence from Four Leading Economics Journals," NBER Working Papers 23282, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Qiang Fu & Ming Li & Xue Qiao, 2022. "On the paradox of mediocracy," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(2), pages 492-521, April.
    4. David Card & Stefano DellaVigna, 2020. "What Do Editors Maximize? Evidence from Four Economics Journals," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 102(1), pages 195-217, March.
    5. Fu, Qiang & Li, Ming, 2014. "Reputation-concerned policy makers and institutional status quo bias," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 15-25.

  2. Elisabeth Schulte, 2006. "Information Aggregation and Preference Heterogeneity in Committees," JEPS Working Papers 06-003, JEPS.

    Cited by:

    1. Huihui Ding & Marcus Pivato, 2021. "Deliberation and epistemic democracy," Post-Print hal-03637874, HAL.
    2. Jackson, Matthew O. & Tan, Xu, 2013. "Deliberation, disclosure of information, and voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(1), pages 2-30.
    3. Jianan Wang, 2021. "Evidence and fully revealing deliberation with non-consequentialist jurors," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 189(3), pages 515-531, December.
    4. Malin Arve & Claudine Desrieux, 2023. "Committee Preferences and Information Acquisition," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 243-260, December.
    5. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez, 2014. "Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/4kpa2fek478, Sciences Po.
    6. Volker Hahn, 2010. "Sequential Aggregation of Verifiable Information," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 10/136, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
    7. Jianan Wang, 2022. "Partially verifiable deliberation in voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 190(3), pages 457-481, March.
    8. Salvador Barberà & Antonio Nicolò, 2021. "Information disclosure with many alternatives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 57(4), pages 851-873, November.
    9. Yingni Guo, 2021. "Information transmission and voting," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 835-868, October.
    10. Pogorelskiy. Kirill & Shum, Matthew, 2019. "News We Like to Share : How News Sharing on Social Networks Influences Voting Outcomes," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1199, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    11. Mark Thordal-Le Quement, 2013. "Communication compatible voting rules," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 74(4), pages 479-507, April.
    12. Elisabeth Schulte, 2012. "Communication in committees: who should listen?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 97-117, January.
    13. Prabal Roy Choudhury & Debadatta Saha, 2009. "Does the market kill bad ideas? An institutional comparision of committees and markets in network industries," Discussion Papers 09-05, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
    14. Pogorelskiy, Kirill & Shum, Matthew, 2019. "News We Like to Share: How News Sharing on Social Networks Influences Voting Outcomes," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 427, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    15. Volker Hahn, 2017. "On the drawbacks of large committees," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(2), pages 563-582, May.

  3. Grüner, Hans Peter & Schulte, Elisabeth, 2004. "Speed and Quality of Collective Decision-Making II: Incentives for Information Provision," CEPR Discussion Papers 4397, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Grüner, Hans Peter, 2009. "Information technology: Efficient restructuring and the productivity puzzle," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 916-929, December.
    2. Grüner, Hans Peter, 2007. "Information Technology, Efficient Restructuring and the Productivity Puzzle," CEPR Discussion Papers 6109, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Grüner, Hans Peter, 2007. "Protocol Design and (De-)Centralization," CEPR Discussion Papers 6357, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Schulte, Elisabeth & Peter Gruner, Hans, 2007. "Speed and quality of collective decision making: Imperfect information processing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 138-154, May.

  4. Grüner, Hans Peter & Schulte, Elisabeth, 2004. "Speed and Quality of Collective Decision-Making, I: Imperfect Information Processing," CEPR Discussion Papers 4179, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Cayir, Sinan & Basoglu, Nuri & Daim, Tugrul U., 2016. "A study on the relationship between task, information, and individual performance," Technology in Society, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 1-9.
    2. Grüner, Hans Peter, 2009. "Information technology: Efficient restructuring and the productivity puzzle," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 916-929, December.
    3. Grüner, Hans Peter, 2007. "Protocol Design and (De-)Centralization," CEPR Discussion Papers 6357, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Cho, Myeonghwan, 2010. "Efficient structure of organization with heterogeneous workers," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(6), pages 1125-1139, November.
    5. Grüner, Hans Peter & Schulte, Elisabeth, 2004. "Speed and Quality of Collective Decision-Making II: Incentives for Information Provision," CEPR Discussion Papers 4397, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Hans Peter Grüner, 2010. "Speed and Quality of Collective Decision Making: Incentives for Information Provision," Post-Print hal-00911831, HAL.
    7. Hans Peter Grüner & Elisabeth Schulte, 2004. "Speed and Quality of Collective Decision Making: Incentives for," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000417, UCLA Department of Economics.

Articles

  1. Mike Felgenhauer & Elisabeth Schulte, 2014. "Strategic Private Experimentation," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 74-105, November.

    Cited by:

    1. Ottaviani, Marco & Di Tillio, Alfredo & Sørensen, Peter Norman, 2016. "Persuasion Bias in Science: Can Economics Help?," CEPR Discussion Papers 11343, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Wu, Jiemai, 2020. "Non-competing persuaders," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
    3. Herresthal, C., 2017. "Hidden Testing and Selective Disclosure of Evidence," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1712, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    4. Mike Felgenhauer, 2019. "Endogenous Persuasion with Costly Verification," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 121(3), pages 1054-1087, July.
    5. Ying Gao, 2022. "Inference from Selectively Disclosed Data," Papers 2204.07191, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2023.
    6. Felgenhauer, Mike & Xu, Fangya, 2019. "State of the debate contingent arguments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 46-48.
    7. Ottaviani, Marco & Di Tillio, Alfredo & Sørensen, Peter Norman, 2017. "Strategic Sample Selection," CEPR Discussion Papers 12202, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Martin Paldam, 2013. "Regression Costs Fall, Mining Ratios Rise, Publication Bias Looms, and Techniques Get Fancier: Reflections on Some Trends in Empirical Macroeconomics," Econ Journal Watch, Econ Journal Watch, vol. 10(2), pages 136-156, May.
    9. Elisabeth Schulte & Mike Felgenhauer, 2015. "Preselection and Expert Advice," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201524, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    10. Xie, Yinxi & Xie, Yang, 2017. "Machiavellian experimentation," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(4), pages 685-711.
    11. Vasudha Jain & Mark Whitmeyer, 2021. "Whose Bias?," Papers 2111.10335, arXiv.org.
    12. Federico Echenique & Kevin He, 2021. "Screening $p$-Hackers: Dissemination Noise as Bait," Papers 2103.09164, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2024.
    13. Qianjun Lyu & Wing Suen, 2023. "Information Design in Cheap Talk," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_470, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    14. Herresthal, Claudia, 2022. "Hidden testing and selective disclosure of evidence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
    15. Matthias Verbeck & Elisabeth Schulte, 2016. "Contracting with Researchers," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201620, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    16. Felgenhauer, Mike, 2021. "Experimentation and manipulation with preregistration," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 400-408.

  2. Elisabeth Schulte, 2012. "Communication in committees: who should listen?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 97-117, January.

    Cited by:

    1. Daniel J. Smith, 2020. "Turn-taking in office," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 205-226, June.
    2. Malin Arve & Claudine Desrieux, 2023. "Committee Preferences and Information Acquisition," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 243-260, December.
    3. Elisabeth Schulte, 2006. "Information Aggregation and Preference Heterogeneity in Committees," JEPS Working Papers 06-003, JEPS.
    4. Yun Wang, 2015. "Bayesian Persuasion with Multiple Receivers," Working Papers 2015-03-24, Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE), Xiamen University.
    5. Masayuki Odora, 2024. "Fragility of The Condorcet Jury Theorem: Information Aggregation and Preference Aggregation," Working Papers 2308, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.

  3. Elisabeth Schulte, 2010. "Information aggregation and preference heterogeneity in committees," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(1), pages 97-118, July.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Grüner, Hans Peter & Schulte, Elisabeth, 2010. "Speed and quality of collective decision making: Incentives for information provision," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 734-747, December.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Schulte, Elisabeth & Peter Gruner, Hans, 2007. "Speed and quality of collective decision making: Imperfect information processing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 138-154, May.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  6. Gerling, Kerstin & Gruner, Hans Peter & Kiel, Alexandra & Schulte, Elisabeth, 2005. "Information acquisition and decision making in committees: A survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 563-597, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Stephen Hansen & Michael McMahon, 2013. "Estimating Bayesian Decision Problems with Heterogeneous Priors," CEP Discussion Papers dp1211, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    2. Hansen, Stephen & McMahon, Michael, 2010. "What Do Outside Experts Bring To A Committee? Evidence From The Bank of England," Economic Research Papers 270783, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    3. Hansen, Stephen & McMahon, Michael, 2011. "How Experts Decide : Identifying Preferences versus Signals from Policy Decisions," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 963, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    4. Andreas Breitenfellner & Wolfgang Pointner, 2021. "The impact of climate change on monetary policy," Monetary Policy & the Economy, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank), issue Q3/21, pages 59-80.
    5. Hahn, Volker, 2017. "Committee design with endogenous participation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 388-408.
    6. Amihai Glazer, 2006. "Predicting Committee Action," Working Papers 050621, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
    7. Mattozzi, Andrea; Nakaguma, Marcos Y., 2016. "Public versus Secret Voting in Committees," Economics Working Papers ECO2016/08, European University Institute.
    8. Helge Berger, 2006. "Optimal central bank design: Benchmarks for the ECB," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 207-235, September.
    9. Etienne Farvaque & Piotr Stanek & Stephane Vigeant, 2013. "On the performance of Monetary Policy Committees," NBP Working Papers 154, Narodowy Bank Polski.
    10. Helge Berger & Volker Nitsch, 2011. "Too Many Cooks? Committees in Monetary Policy," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 78(2), pages 452-475, October.
    11. Y. Braouezec, 2010. "Committee, Expert Advice, and the Weighted Majority Algorithm: An Application to the Pricing Decision of a Monopolist," Post-Print hal-00677779, HAL.
    12. Sibert, Anne, 2006. "Central Banking by Committee," CEPR Discussion Papers 5626, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    13. Belke, Ansgar & von Schnurbein, Barbara, 2010. "European Monetary Policy and the ECB Rotation Model – Voting Power of the Core versus the Periphery," Ruhr Economic Papers 175, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    14. Sibert, Anne & Mihov, Ilian, 2002. "Credibility and Flexibility with Monetary Policy Committees," CEPR Discussion Papers 3278, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    15. Gnan, Phillipp & Rieder, Kilian, 2023. "The (not so) quiet period: Communication by ECB decision-makers during monetary policy blackout days☆," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 130(C).
    16. Breitmoser, Yves & Valasek, Justin, 2017. "A rationale for unanimity in committees," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change SP II 2017-308, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    17. Petra Gerlach-Kristen, 2008. "The Role of the Chairman in Setting Monetary Policy: Individualistic vs. Autocratically Collegial MPCs," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 4(3), pages 119-143, September.
    18. Mr. Helge Berger & Mr. Tonny Lybek & Volker Nitsch, 2006. "Central Bank Boards Around the World: Why Does Membership Size Differ?," IMF Working Papers 2006/281, International Monetary Fund.
    19. Potrafke, Niklas, 2013. "Minority positions in the German Council of Economic Experts: A political economic analysis," Munich Reprints in Economics 19290, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    20. Arnab Bhattacharjee & Sean Holly, 2004. "Inflation Targeting, committee Decision Making and Uncertainty: The case of the Bank of England's MPC," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2004 63, Money Macro and Finance Research Group.
    21. Gersbach, Hans & Mamageishvili, Akaki & Tejada, Oriol, 2020. "Appointed Learning for the Common Good: Optimal Committee Size and Efficient Rewards," CEPR Discussion Papers 15311, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    22. Bayindir, Esra Eren & Gurdal, Mehmet Yigit & Saglam, Ismail, 2019. "A Game Theoretic Approach to Peer Review of Grant Proposals," Journal of Informetrics, Elsevier, vol. 13(4).
    23. Fifić, Mario & Gigerenzer, Gerd, 2014. "Are two interviewers better than one?," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 67(8), pages 1771-1779.
    24. Petia Niederländer & Doris Ritzberger-Grünwald & Karin Turner-Hrdlicka, 2021. "Gender, money and finance," Monetary Policy & the Economy, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank), issue Q3/21, pages 83-92.
    25. César Martinelli, 2007. "Rational ignorance and voting behavior," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(3), pages 315-335, February.
    26. Rausser, Gordon C. & Simon, Leo K. & Zhao, Jinhua, 2008. "Rational Exaggeration in Information Aggregation Games," CUDARE Working Papers 43976, University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    27. Sobbrio, Francesco & Navarra, Pietro, 2009. "Electoral Participation and Communicative Voting in Europe," MPRA Paper 18311, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    28. Szilárd Erhart & Jose-Luis Vasquez-Paz, 2007. "Optimal monetary policy committee size: Theory and cross country evidence," MNB Working Papers 2007/6, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (Central Bank of Hungary).
    29. Carsten Hefeker & Blandine Zimmer, 2015. "Optimal Conservatism and Collective Monetary Policymaking under Uncertainty," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 259-278, April.
    30. Gersbach, Hans & Mamageishvili, Akaki & Tejada, Oriol, 2022. "Appointed learning for the common good: Optimal committee size and monetary transfers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 153-176.
    31. Mikael Apel & Carl Andreas Claussen & Petra Gerlach-Kristen & Petra Lennartsdotter & Øistein Røisland, 2013. "Monetary policy decisions – comparing theory and “inside” information from MPC members," Working Paper 2013/03, Norges Bank.
    32. Mihov, Ilian & Sibert, Anne, 2006. "Credibility and Flexibility with Independent Monetary Policy Committees," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(1), pages 23-46, February.
    33. McMahon, Michael & Hansen, Stephen, 2013. "First Impressions Matter: Signalling as a Source of Policy Dynamics," CEPR Discussion Papers 9607, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    34. Etienne Farvaque & Norimichi Matsueda & Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2008. "How monetary policy committees impact the volatility of policy rates," Working Papers CEB 08-026.RS, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    35. Berentsen, Aleksander & Strub, Carlo, 2009. "Central bank design with heterogeneous agents," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 139-152, February.
    36. Hahn, Volker & Mühe, Felix, 2009. "Committees and reciprocity," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 26-47, January.
    37. Fatum, Rasmus, 2006. "One monetary policy and 18 central bankers: The European monetary policy as a game of strategic delegation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(4), pages 659-669, May.
    38. Paolo Balduzzi & Clara Graziano & Annalisa Luporini, 2011. "Voting in Small Committees," Working Papers - Economics wp2011_01.rdf, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
    39. Gerlach-Kristen, Petra, 2008. "Taking two steps at a time: On the optimal pattern of policy interest rates," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 550-570, February.
    40. Hans Gersbach & Volker Hahn, 2012. "Information acquisition and transparency in committees," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(2), pages 427-453, May.
    41. Agnès Bénassy‐Quéré & Edouard Turkisch, 2009. "The ECB Governing Council in an Enlarged Euro Area," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(1), pages 25-53, January.
    42. Ruth Ben-Yashar & Mor Zahavi, 2011. "The Condorcet jury theorem and extension of the franchise with rationally ignorant voters," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(3), pages 435-443, September.
    43. Jerome Mathis, 2006. "Deliberation with Partially Verifiable Information," THEMA Working Papers 2006-03, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    44. Yukio Koriyama & Ali Ihsan Ozkes, 2017. "Condorcet Jury Theorem and Cognitive Hierarchies: Theory and Experiments," AMSE Working Papers 1708, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
    45. Ascari, Guido & Rankin, Neil, 2007. "Perpetual youth and endogenous labor supply: A problem and a possible solution," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 708-723, December.
    46. Peter Breyer & Eleonora Endlich & Dieter Huber & Doris Oswald & Christoph Prenner & Lukas Reiss & Martin Schneider & Walter Waschiczek, 2021. "Eigenkapitalausstattung österreichischer Unternehmen – Hindernisse und Handlungsoptionen," Monetary Policy & the Economy, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank), issue Q3/21, pages 1-22.
    47. Bhattacharjee, A. & Holly, S., 2010. "Understanding Interactions in Social Networks and Committees," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1003, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    48. Alejandro Montecinos‐Pearce & Pablo Rodrigo & Ignacio J. Duran, 2020. "When is escalation of commitment unstoppable in group settings? An iterative economic modeling approach to unveil the dark side of group decision‐making," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 41(8), pages 1387-1402, December.
    49. Berk, Jan Marc & Bierut, Beata K., 2011. "Communication in a monetary policy committee," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 791-801.
    50. Charemza, Wojciech & Ladley, Daniel, 2016. "Central banks’ forecasts and their bias: Evidence, effects and explanation," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 804-817.
    51. Etienne Farvaque & Hakim Hammadou & Piotr Stanek, 2011. "Selecting Your Inflation Targeters: Background and Performance of Monetary Policy Committee Members," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 12(2), pages 223-238, May.
    52. Chernomaz, K. & Goertz, J.M.M., 2023. "(A)symmetric equilibria and adaptive learning dynamics in small-committee voting," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 147(C).
    53. International Monetary Fund, 2009. "A European Mandate for Financial Sector Supervisors in the EU," IMF Working Papers 2009/005, International Monetary Fund.
    54. Elisabeth Schulte, 2006. "Information Aggregation and Preference Heterogeneity in Committees," JEPS Working Papers 06-003, JEPS.
    55. Rune Midjord & Tomas Rodriguez Barraquer & Justin Valasek, 2013. "Over-Caution of Large Committees of Experts," Discussion Paper Series dp654, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    56. Jun Chen, 2021. "The Condorcet Jury Theorem with Information Acquisition," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(4), pages 1-33, October.
    57. Bauke Visser & Otto H. Swank, 2005. "On Committees of Experts," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 05-028/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    58. Christian Bruns, 2013. "Elections and Market Provision of Information," CESifo Working Paper Series 4091, CESifo.
    59. Carsten Hefeker, 2006. "EMU Enlargement, Policy Uncertainty and Economic Reforms," CESifo Working Paper Series 1767, CESifo.
    60. Melissa Newham & Rune Midjord, 2018. "Herd Behavior in FDA Committees: A Structural Approach," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1744, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    61. Stephen Hansen & Carlos Velasco Rivera & Michael McMahon, 2013. "How Experts Decide: Preferences or Private Assessments on a Monetary Policy Committee?," CAMA Working Papers 2013-19, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
    62. Rieder, Kilian & Gnan, Phillipp, 2022. "The (Not So) Quiet Period: Communication by ECB Decision-makers during Monetary Policy Blackout Days," CEPR Discussion Papers 15735, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    63. Hahn, Volker, 2016. "Designing monetary policy committees," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 47-67.
    64. Job Swank & Otto Swank & Bauke Visser, 2006. "Transparency and Pre-meetings," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-051/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    65. Tillmann, Peter, 2011. "Strategic forecasting on the FOMC," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 547-553, September.
    66. Keiichi Morimoto, 2021. "Information Use and the Condorcet Jury Theorem," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 9(10), pages 1-22, May.
    67. Arnab Bhattacharjee & Sean Holly, 2010. "Rational Partisan Theory, Uncertainty, And Spatial Voting: Evidence For The Bank Of England'S Mpc," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(2), pages 151-179, July.
    68. Ansgar Belke & Barbara Schnurbein, 2012. "European monetary policy and the ECB rotation model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(1), pages 289-323, April.
    69. Carsten Hefeker, 2011. "Policy Uncertainty and Economic Reforms in a Monetary Union," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 12(3), pages 274-285, August.
    70. Manouchehrabadi, Behrang & Letizia, Paolo & Hendrikse, George, 2021. "Governance of collective entrepreneurship," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 185(C), pages 370-389.
    71. Triossi, Matteo, 2013. "Costly information acquisition. Is it better to toss a coin?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 169-191.
    72. Mark Harris & Paul Levine & Christopher Spencer, 2011. "A decade of dissent: explaining the dissent voting behavior of Bank of England MPC members," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 146(3), pages 413-442, March.
    73. Xie, Yinxi & Xie, Yang, 2017. "Machiavellian experimentation," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(4), pages 685-711.
    74. Van Parys, Jessica & Ash, Elliott, 2018. "Sequential decision-making with group identity," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 1-18.
    75. Midjord, Rune & Rodríguez Barraquer, Tomás & Valasek, Justin, 2017. "Voting in large committees with disesteem payoffs: A ‘state of the art’ model," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 430-443.
    76. Mikael Apel & Carl Andreas Claussen & Petra Lennartsdotter & Øistein Røisland, 2015. "Monetary Policy Committees: Comparing Theory and "Inside" Information from MPC Members," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 11(4), pages 47-89, December.
    77. Bosman, R. & Maier, P. & Sadiraj, V. & van Winden, F., 2013. "Let me vote! An experimental study of vote rotation in committees," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 32-47.
    78. Sylvester Eijffinger & Ronald Mahieu & Louis Raes, 2016. "Monetary Policy Committees, Voting Behavior and Ideal Points," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1628, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    79. Großer, Jens & Seebauer, Michael, 2016. "The curse of uninformed voting: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 205-226.
    80. Hahn, Volker, 2012. "On the Optimal Size of Committees of Experts," VfS Annual Conference 2012 (Goettingen): New Approaches and Challenges for the Labor Market of the 21st Century 62041, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    81. Johanna M.M. Goertz & Kirill Chernomaz, 2019. "Voting in Three-Alternative Committees: An Experiment," Games, MDPI, vol. 10(2), pages 1-23, May.
    82. Christopher Spencer, 2006. "The Dissent Voting Behaviour of Bank of England MPC Members," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0306, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
    83. Horváth Roman & Šmídková Kateřina & Zápal Jan, 2016. "Voting in Central Banks: Theory versus Stylized Facts," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 16(4), pages 1-62, October.
    84. Szilárd Erhart & Jose Luis Vasquez-Paz, 2008. "Determinants of the size of a monetary policy committee: Theory and cross country evidence," Working Papers 2008-001, Banco Central de Reserva del Perú.
    85. Berger, Helge & Müller, Till, 2004. "How should large and small countries be represented in a currency union?," Discussion Papers 2004/20, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
    86. Jung, Alexander & Mongelli, Francesco, 2013. "Monetary policy decision-making when information search is costly," MPRA Paper 80517, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 25 May 2016.
    87. Rieder, Kilian, 2022. "Monetary policy decision-making by committee: Why, when and how it can work," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    88. Ruth Ben-Yashar, 2023. "An application of simple majority rule to a group with an even number of voters," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 94(1), pages 83-95, January.
    89. Elisabeth Schulte, 2012. "Communication in committees: who should listen?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 97-117, January.
    90. Alvaro J. Name-Correa & Huseyin Yildirim, 2018. "A capture theory of committees," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 177(1), pages 135-154, October.
    91. Hansen, Stephen & McMahon, Michael & Velasco Rivera, Carlos, 2014. "Preferences or private assessments on a monetary policy committee?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 16-32.
    92. Volker Hahn, 2017. "On the drawbacks of large committees," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(2), pages 563-582, May.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 5 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (4) 2004-02-29 2005-02-13 2016-02-12 2016-09-11
  2. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (3) 2004-02-29 2005-02-13 2006-10-14
  3. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (2) 2004-02-29 2006-10-14
  4. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (1) 2016-09-11
  5. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (1) 2005-02-13
  6. NEP-HME: Heterodox Microeconomics (1) 2016-09-11
  7. NEP-KNM: Knowledge Management and Knowledge Economy (1) 2006-10-14
  8. NEP-LAW: Law and Economics (1) 2016-02-12
  9. NEP-NET: Network Economics (1) 2005-02-13
  10. NEP-UPT: Utility Models and Prospect Theory (1) 2016-02-12

Corrections

All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. For general information on how to correct material on RePEc, see these instructions.

To update listings or check citations waiting for approval, Elisabeth Schulte should log into the RePEc Author Service.

To make corrections to the bibliographic information of a particular item, find the technical contact on the abstract page of that item. There, details are also given on how to add or correct references and citations.

To link different versions of the same work, where versions have a different title, use this form. Note that if the versions have a very similar title and are in the author's profile, the links will usually be created automatically.

Please note that most corrections can take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.