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European Monetary Policy and the ECB Rotation Model: Voting Power of the Core versus the Periphery

  • Ansgar Belke
  • Barbara von Schnurbein

We analyze the ECB Governing Council's voting procedures. The literature has by now discussed numerous aspects of the rotation model but does not account for many institutional aspects of the voting procedure of the GC. Using the randomization scheme based on the multilinear extension (MLE) of games, we try to close three of these gaps. First, we integrate specific preferences of national central bank presidents, i.e. their desired interest rates. Second, we address the agenda-setting power of the ECB president. Third, we do not simulate an average of the decisions but look at every relevant point in time separately.

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File URL: http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.353447.de/dp983.pdf
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Paper provided by DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research in its series Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin with number 983.

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Length: 39 p.
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp983
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  1. Carsten Hefeker, 2003. "Federal Monetary Policy," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 105(4), pages 643-659, December.
  2. Taylor, John B., 1993. "Discretion versus policy rules in practice," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 195-214, December.
  3. Friedrich Heinemann & Felix P. Huefner, 2004. "Is The View From The Eurotower Purely European? - National Divergence And Ecb Interest Rate Policy," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 51(4), pages 544-558, 09.
  4. Ellen E. Meade & D. Nathan Sheets, 2002. "Regional influences on U.S. monetary policy: some implications for Europe," International Finance Discussion Papers 721, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  5. Francesco Passarelli & Jason Barr, 2007. "Preferences, the Agenda Setter, and the Distribution of Power in the EU," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 41-60, January.
  6. Gerlach-Kristen, Petra, 2006. "Monetary policy committees and interest rate setting," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 487-507, February.
  7. Owen, G & Shapley, L S, 1989. "Optimal Location of Candidates in Ideological Space," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 339-56.
  8. Christian Fahrholz & Philipp Mohl, 2004. "EMU-enlargement and the Reshaping of Decision-making within the ECB Governing Council: A Voting-Power Analysis," Eastward Enlargement of the Euro-zone Working Papers wp23, Free University Berlin, Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, revised 01 Jun 2004.
  9. Ansgar Belke, 2003. "The rotation model is not sustainable," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 119-124, May.
  10. Kiel, Alexandra & Gerling, Kerstin & Schulte, Elisabeth & Grüner, Hans Peter, 2003. "Information acquisition and decision making in committees: a survey," Working Paper Series 0256, European Central Bank.
  11. Ullrich, Katrin, 2004. "Decision-Making of the ECB: Reform and Voting Power," ZEW Discussion Papers 04-70, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  12. Ansgar Belke & Barbara Styczynska, 2004. "The Allocation of Power in the Enlarged ECB Governing Council: An Assessment of the ECB Rotation Model," Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Hohenheim 242/2004, Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany.
  13. Ellen Meade, 2003. "A (critical) appraisal of the ECB’s voting reform," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 129-131, May.
  14. Meade, Ellen E & Sheets, D Nathan, 2005. "Regional Influences on FOMC Voting Patterns," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 37(4), pages 661-77, August.
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