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European Monetary Policy and the ECB Rotation Model: Voting Power of the Core versus the Periphery

  • Ansgar Belke
  • Barbara von Schnurbein

We analyze the ECB Governing Council's voting procedures. The literature has by now discussed numerous aspects of the rotation model but does not account for many institutional aspects of the voting procedure of the GC. Using the randomization scheme based on the multilinear extension (MLE) of games, we try to close three of these gaps. First, we integrate specific preferences of national central bank presidents, i.e. their desired interest rates. Second, we address the agenda-setting power of the ECB president. Third, we do not simulate an average of the decisions but look at every relevant point in time separately.

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File URL: http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.353447.de/dp983.pdf
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Paper provided by DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research in its series Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin with number 983.

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Length: 39 p.
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp983
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  1. Owen, G & Shapley, L S, 1989. "Optimal Location of Candidates in Ideological Space," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 339-56.
  2. Gerlach, Stefan & Schnabel, Gert, 1999. "The Taylor Rule and Interest Rates in the EMU Area," CEPR Discussion Papers 2271, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Meade, Ellen E & Sheets, D Nathan, 2005. "Regional Influences on FOMC Voting Patterns," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 37(4), pages 661-77, August.
  4. Ellen E. Meade & D. Nathan Sheets, 2002. "Regional Influences on U.S. Monetary Policy: Some Implications for Europe," CEP Discussion Papers dp0523, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  5. Agn�S Bénassy-Quéré & Edouard Turkisch, 2009. "The ECB Governing Council in an Enlarged Euro Area," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47, pages 25-53, 01.
  6. Christian Fahrholz & Philipp Mohl, 2004. "EMU-enlargement and the Reshaping of Decision-making within the ECB Governing Council: A Voting-Power Analysis," Eastward Enlargement of the Euro-zone Working Papers wp23, Free University Berlin, Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, revised 01 Jun 2004.
  7. Ellen E. Meade & D. Nathan Sheets, 2002. "Regional influences on U.S. monetary policy: some implications for Europe," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 20091, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  8. Francesco Passarelli & Jason Barr, 2007. "Preferences, the Agenda Setter, and the Distribution of Power in the EU," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 41-60, January.
  9. Ansgar Belke, 2003. "The rotation model is not sustainable," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 119-124, May.
  10. Ansgar Belke & Barbara Styczynska, 2004. "The Allocation of Power in the Enlarged ECB Governing Council: An Assessment of the ECB Rotation Model," Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Hohenheim 242/2004, Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany.
  11. Carsten Hefeker, 2001. "Federal Monetary Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 422, CESifo Group Munich.
  12. Ulrich Bindseil, 2001. "A Coalition-Form Analysis Of The “One Country - One Vote” Rule In The Governing Council Of The European Central Bank," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(1), pages 145-164.
  13. Agnès Bénassy-Quéré & Edouard Turkisch, 2009. "The ECB Governing Council in an Enlarged Euro Area," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00634791, HAL.
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