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Banzhaf value for games analyzing voting with rotation

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  • Honorata Sosnowska

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Abstract

In this paper we shall present the voting procedure with rotation scheme used by the Governing Council of the European Central Bank as it enlarges to accommodate new members of the economic and monetary union. The main game theoretical approaches were presented in Sosnowska, 2013. That paper considered the Shapley value computed in accordance with these approaches. In this paper the Banzhaf value is analysed. The results are compared with the results for the Shapley value.

Suggested Citation

  • Honorata Sosnowska, 2014. "Banzhaf value for games analyzing voting with rotation," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Technology, Institute of Organization and Management, vol. 4, pages 75-88.
  • Handle: RePEc:wut:journl:v:4:y:2014:p:75-88:id:1145
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ansgar Belke & Barbara Styczynska, 2006. "The Allocation of Power in the Enlarged ECB Governing Council: An Assessment of the ECB Rotation Model," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(5), pages 865-897, December.
    2. Honorata Sosnowska, 2013. "Analysis of the voting method used in the European Central Bank," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Technology, Institute of Organization and Management, vol. 1, pages 75-86.
    3. Ansgar Belke & Barbara Styczynska, 2006. "The Allocation of Power in the Enlarged ECB Governing Council: An Assessment of the ECB Rotation Model," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44, pages 865-897, December.
    4. Marc Roubens & Michel Grabisch, 1999. "An axiomatic approach to the concept of interaction among players in cooperative games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 28(4), pages 547-565.
    5. Shapley, L. S. & Shubik, Martin, 1954. "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(3), pages 787-792, September.
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    Keywords

    voting; EBC; Shapley value; Banzhaf value;

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