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Analysis of the voting method used in the European Central Bank

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  • Honorata Sosnowska

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Abstract

Game theoreticians usually deal with standard voting methods, such as plurality voting or approval voting. In reality however, some complicated non-standard voting methods are used. In this paper we shall present the voting method and rotation scheme used by the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB), as it enlarges to accommodate new members of the economic and monetary union. We present game theoretical approaches to analyzing this method and different methods of computing the Shapley value for games connected with voting under such rotation schemes.

Suggested Citation

  • Honorata Sosnowska, 2013. "Analysis of the voting method used in the European Central Bank," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Technology, Institute of Organization and Management, vol. 1, pages 75-86.
  • Handle: RePEc:wut:journl:v:1:y:2013:p:75-86:id:1054
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    File URL: http://orduser.pwr.wroc.pl/DownloadFile.aspx?aid=1054
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Francesco Passarelli & Jason Barr, 2007. "Preferences, the Agenda Setter, and the Distribution of Power in the EU," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(1), pages 41-60, January.
    2. Ansgar Belke & Barbara Styczynska, 2006. "The Allocation of Power in the Enlarged ECB Governing Council: An Assessment of the ECB Rotation Model," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(5), pages 865-897, December.
    3. Shapley, L. S. & Shubik, Martin, 1954. "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(3), pages 787-792, September.
    4. Ansgar Belke & Barbara Styczynska, 2006. "The Allocation of Power in the Enlarged ECB Governing Council: An Assessment of the ECB Rotation Model," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44, pages 865-897, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Charemza, Wojciech, 2020. "Central banks' voting contest," MPRA Paper 101205, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Honorata Sosnowska, 2014. "Banzhaf value for games analyzing voting with rotation," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Technology, Institute of Organization and Management, vol. 4, pages 75-88.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    voting; ECB; Shapley value;

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