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Who gets what, when, and how revisited: Voting and proposal powers in the allocation of the EU budget

  • Deniz Aksoy


    (Pennsylvania State University, USA)

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    What are the factors that help EU member states to secure favourable bargaining outcomes? Although existing research highlights the importance of the member states' 'political power', scholars tend to equate this with their voting power. In this paper, I argue that proposal-making power associated with the EU presidency helps the member states to obtain preferable negotiation outcomes. Analysis of the cross-state allocation of the EU budget from 1977-2003 shows that holding the EU presidency during the time of allocation decisions brings financial benefits to individual member states.

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    Article provided by in its journal European Union Politics.

    Volume (Year): 11 (2010)
    Issue (Month): 2 (June)
    Pages: 171-194

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    Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:11:y:2010:i:2:p:171-194
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