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Alliances Electorales et Gouvernementales : La Contribution de la Théorie des Jeux Coopératifs à la Science Politique

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  • Le Breton, Michel
  • Van Der Straeten, Karine

Abstract

This article provides an overview of the main empirical and theoretical contributions on government formation and electoral alliances based on cooperative game theory.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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  • Le Breton, Michel & Van Der Straeten, Karine, 2017. "Alliances Electorales et Gouvernementales : La Contribution de la Théorie des Jeux Coopératifs à la Science Politique," TSE Working Papers 17-789, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Jun 2017.
    • Handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:31584
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