Demand commitment in legislative bargaining
Morelli (American Political Science Review, 1999) provides a majoritarian bargaining model in which the parties make payoff demands and the order of moves is chosen by the leading party. Morelli's main proposition states that the ex post distribution of payoffs inside the coalition that forms is proportional to the homogeneous representation of the game. We provide a counterexample and prove a weaker result: proportional payoffs hold if the rules are modified so that the parties must move in decreasing order of weight.
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