Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative Voting Game
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Jackson, Matthew O. & Moselle, Boaz, 2002. "Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative Voting Game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 49-87, March.
References listed on IDEAS
- Baron, David P. & Ferejohn, John A., 1989. "Bargaining in Legislatures," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(4), pages 1181-1206, December.
- Brams, S.J. & Jones, M.A. & Kilgour, D.M., 1999. "The Paradox of Disconnected Coalitions," Working Papers 99-19, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Harrington, Joseph E, Jr, 1990. "The Power of the Proposal Maker in a Model of Endogenous Agenda Formation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 64(1), pages 1-20, January.
- Baron, David P., 1991. "A Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 85(1), pages 137-164, March.
- Harrington, Joseph Jr., 1989. "The advantageous nature of risk aversion in a three-player bargaining game where acceptance of a proposal requires a simple majority," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 195-200, September.
- Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey, 1988.
"Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes,"
American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 82(2), pages 405-422, June.
- Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey., 1987. "Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes," Working Papers 643, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1996.
"Bargaining and Value,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(2), pages 357-380, March.
- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1994. "Bargaining and value," Economics Working Papers 114, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Feb 1995.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- James M. Snyder Jr. & Michael M. Ting & Stephen Ansolabehere, 2005. "Legislative Bargaining under Weighted Voting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 981-1004, September.
- Malte Braack & Christian Henning & Johannes Ziesmer, 2024. "Pure strategy Nash equilibria for bargaining models of collective choice," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 53(2), pages 373-421, June.
- Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha & Oak, Mandar P., 2008.
"Coalition governments in a model of parliamentary democracy,"
European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 554-561, September.
- Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha & Oak, Mandar, 2006. "Coalition Governments in a Model of Parliamentary Democracy," Coalition Theory Network Working Papers 12173, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
- Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Mandar Oak, 2006. "Coalition Governments in a Model of Parliamentary Democracy," Working Papers 2006.83, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Antonio Merlo, 2005. "Whither Political Economy? Theories, Facts and Issues," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-033, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Dec 2005.
- M. Puy, 2013.
"Stable coalition governments: the case of three political parties,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(1), pages 65-87, January.
- M. Socorro Puy, 2009. "Stable Coalition-Governments: The Case of Three Political Parties," Working Papers 2009-3, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
- Cho, Seok-ju & Duggan, John, 2009.
"Bargaining foundations of the median voter theorem,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 851-868, March.
- John Duggan & Seok-ju Cho, 2007. "Bargaining Foundations of the Median Voter Theorem," Wallis Working Papers WP49, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
- Gerald Pech, 2004. "Coalition Governments Versus Minority Governments: Bargaining Power, Cohesion and Budgeting Outcomes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 1-24, October.
- Diermeier, Daniel & Merlo, Antonio, 2004.
"An empirical investigation of coalitional bargaining procedures,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 783-797, March.
- Daniel Diermeier & Antoni Merlo, 1999. "An Empirical Investigation of Coalitional Bargaining Procedures," Discussion Papers 1267, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Diermeier, Daniel & Merlo, Antonio, 2000.
"Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 46-79, September.
- Diermeier, Daniel & Merlo, Antonio, 1998. "Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies," Working Papers 98-31, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Daniel Diermeier & Antonio Merlo, 1998. "Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies," Discussion Papers 1232, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Diermeier, Daniel & Merlo, Antonio, 1998. "Government turnover in parliamentary democracies," Bulletins 7453, University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center.
- Sven de Vries & Rakesh Vohra, 2000. "A Structural Model of Government Formation," Discussion Papers 1297, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Merlo, Antonio, 1997.
"Bargaining over Governments in a Stochastic Environment,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 101-131, February.
- Merlo, A., 1992. "Bargaining Over Governments in a Stochastic Environment," Working Papers 92-55, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Merlo, Antonio, 1996. "Bargaining over governments in a stochastic environment," Bulletins 7476, University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center.
- Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Mandar Oak, 2022.
"Party Formation and Coalitional Bargaining in a Model of Proportional Representation,"
Games, MDPI, vol. 13(4), pages 1-17, June.
- Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Mandar Oak, 2004. "Party Formation and Coalitional Bargaining in a Model of Proportional Representation," Working Papers 2004.98, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Mandar Oak & Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay, 2004. "Party Formation And Coalitional Bargaining In A Model Of Proportional Representation," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2004 37, Royal Economic Society.
- Stéphane Rottier & Francis Bloch, 2002.
"Agenda control in coalition formation,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(4), pages 769-788.
- Bloch, Francis & Rottier, Stéphane, 1999. "Agenda Control in Coalition Formation," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 1999034, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- BLOCH, Francis & ROTTIER, Stéphane, 1999. "Agenda control in coalition formation," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1999067, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Hughes, Niall, 2016.
"Voting in legislative elections under plurality rule,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 51-93.
- Hughes, Niall, 2014. "Voting In Legislative Elections Under Plurality Rule," Economic Research Papers 270228, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
- Hughes, Niall, 2015. "Voting In Legislative Elections Under Plurality Rule," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 03, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
- Hughes, Niall E, 2014. "Voting in Legislative Elections Under Plurality Rule," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1055, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Hughes, Niall, 2015. "Voting In Legislative Elections Under Plurality Rule," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1097, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Hughes, Niall, 2015. "Voting in Legislative Elections Under Plurality Rule," Economic Research Papers 269728, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
- David P Baron, 2018. "Elections and durable governments in parliamentary governments," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 30(1), pages 74-118, January.
- Agustín Casas & Martín Gonzalez-Eiras, 2021. "Cooperation and Retaliation in Legislative Bargaining," Working Papers 95, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
- Montero, Maria & Vidal-Puga, Juan J., 2007.
"Demand Commitment in Legislative Bargaining,"
American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 101(4), pages 847-850, November.
- Maria Montero & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2005. "Demand commitment in legislative bargaining," Game Theory and Information 0511005, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Montero, Maria, 2006. "Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 380-397, February.
- Jan Zápal, 2017. "Crafting consensus," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 173(1), pages 169-200, October.
- Tasos Kalandrakis, 2006.
"Proposal Rights and Political Power,"
American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 50(2), pages 441-448, April.
- Tasos Kalandrakis, 2004. "Proposal Rights and Political Power," Wallis Working Papers WP38, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
More about this item
Keywords
Bargaining; Legislative Voting; Political Parties; Coalition Formation;All these keywords.
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:clt:sswopa:1036. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Victoria Mason (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.hss.caltech.edu/ss .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.