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Negotiation in legislatures over government formation

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  • Michael Laver
  • Scott Marchi
  • Hande Mutlu

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  • Michael Laver & Scott Marchi & Hande Mutlu, 2011. "Negotiation in legislatures over government formation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(3), pages 285-304, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:147:y:2011:i:3:p:285-304
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-010-9627-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Diermeier, Daniel & Merlo, Antonio, 2004. "An empirical investigation of coalitional bargaining procedures," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 783-797, March.
    2. Warwick, Paul V., 1996. "Coalition Government Membership in West European Parliamentary Democracies," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 26(4), pages 471-499, October.
    3. Baron, David P. & Ferejohn, John A., 1989. "Bargaining in Legislatures," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(4), pages 1181-1206, December.
    4. Daniel Diermeier & Hulya Eraslan & Antonio Merlo, 2003. "A Structural Model of Government Formation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(1), pages 27-70, January.
    5. James M. Snyder Jr. & Michael M. Ting & Stephen Ansolabehere, 2005. "Legislative Bargaining under Weighted Voting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 981-1004, September.
    6. H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
    7. Montero, Maria, 2006. "Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 380-397, February.
    8. Diermeier, Daniel & Stevenson, Randolph T., 2000. "Cabinet Terminations and Critical Events," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 94(3), pages 627-640, September.
    9. Lupia, Arthur & Strøm, Kaare, 1995. "Coalition Termination and the Strategic Timing of Parliamentary Elections," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(3), pages 648-665, September.
    10. Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey, 1988. "Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 82(2), pages 405-422, June.
    11. Warwick, Paul V. & Druckman, James N., 2001. "Portfolio Salience and the Proportionality of Payoffs in Coalition Governments," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 31(4), pages 627-649, October.
    12. Browne, Eric C. & Franklin, Mark N., 1973. "Aspects of Coalition Payoffs in European Parliamentary Democracies," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 67(2), pages 453-469, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hughes, Niall, 2016. "Voting in legislative elections under plurality rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 51-93.
    2. Max Gallop, 2017. "More dangerous than dyads: how a third party enables rationalist explanations for war," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(3), pages 353-381, July.
    3. Shadmehr, Mehdi, 2015. "Simple decision rules in small groups: Collegial rule vs. rotational rule," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 51-63.
    4. Montero, Maria, 2017. "Proportional Payoffs in Legislative Bargaining with Weighted Voting: A Characterization," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 12(3), pages 325-346, October.
    5. Maria Montero, 2015. "A Model of Protocoalition Bargaining with Breakdown Probability," Games, MDPI, vol. 6(2), pages 1-18, April.
    6. Jan Zápal, 2017. "Crafting consensus," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 173(1), pages 169-200, October.
    7. Ravi Bhavnani & Nina Schlager & Karsten Donnay & Mirko Reul & Laura Schenker & Maxime Stauffer & Tirtha Patel, 2023. "Household behavior and vulnerability to acute malnutrition in Kenya," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 10(1), pages 1-14, December.

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