Demand bargaining and proportional payoffs in majority games
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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More about this item
KeywordsDemand bargaining Coalition formation Weighted majority games Minimal winning coalitions;
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