The demand bargaining set: general characterization and application to majority games
The cooperative solution concept introduced here, the demand bargaining set, contains the core and is included in the Zhou bargaining set, eliminating the “dominated” coalition structures. The demand vectors belonging to the demand bargaining set are self-stable. In the class of constant-sum homogeneous weighted majority games the demand bargaining set is non-empty and predicts a unique demand vector, namely a proportional distribution within minimal winning coalitions. The noncooperative implementation of the demand bargaining set is obtained for all the games that satisfy the one-stage property.
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