The Stable Demand Set General Characterization and Application to Majority Games
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|Date of creation:||Mar 2001|
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- Daniel Granot & Michael Maschler, 1997. "The Reactive Bargaining Set: Structure, Dynamics and Extension to NTU Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 26(1), pages 75-95.
- Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2000. "Implementation of Bargaining Sets via Simple Mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 106-120, April.
- Maschler, Michael, 1992. "The bargaining set, kernel, and nucleolus," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 18, pages 591-667 Elsevier.
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