IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

On (Non-) Monotonicity of Cooperative Solutions

  • Yair Tauman

    (Tel Aviv University and Stony Brook University)

  • Andriy Zapechelnyuk

    ()

    (University of Bonn and Kyiv School of Economics)

Aggregate monotonicity of cooperative solutions is widely accepted as a desirable property, and examples where certain solution concepts (such as the nucleolus) violate this property are scarce and have no economic interpretation. We provide an example of a simple four-player game that points out at a class of economic contexts where aggregate monotonicity is not appealing.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://repec.kse.org.ua/pdf/KSE_dp13.pdf
File Function: Revised version, October 2009
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Kyiv School of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 13.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: Jan 2009
Date of revision: Oct 2009
Handle: RePEc:kse:dpaper:13
Note: Published in International Journal of Game Theory 39, 171-175 (2010)
Contact details of provider: Postal: 13 Yakira Str, 04119 Kyiv
Phone: (38-044)492-8012
Fax: (38-044)492-8011
Web page: http://www.kse.org.ua/
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Potters, J.A.M. & Poos, R. & Tijs, S.H. & Muto, S., 1989. "Clan games," Other publications TiSEM 1855e4e3-7392-4ef0-a073-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  2. repec:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154241 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Potters, Jos & Poos, Rene & Tijs, Stef & Muto, Shigeo, 1989. "Clan games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 275-293, September.
  4. Moulin, Herve & Thomson, William, 1988. "Can everyone benefit from growth? : Two difficulties," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 339-345, September.
  5. Toru Hokari, 2000. "note: The nucleolus is not aggregate-monotonic on the domain of convex games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 133-137.
  6. Vincent Feltkamp & Javier Arin, 1997. "The Nucleolus and Kernel of Veto-Rich Transferable Utility Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 61-73.
  7. Maschler, Michael, 1992. "The bargaining set, kernel, and nucleolus," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 18, pages 591-667 Elsevier.
  8. Yevgenia Apartsin & Ron Holzman, 2003. "The core and the bargaining set in glove-market games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 189-204, December.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kse:dpaper:13. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Iryna Sobetska)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.