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note: The nucleolus is not aggregate-monotonic on the domain of convex games

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  • Toru Hokari

    () (Department of Economics, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627, USA)

Abstract

We show that the nucleolus is not aggregate-monotonic on the domain of convex games, and that this lack of monotonicity holds even if there are as few as four agents.

Suggested Citation

  • Toru Hokari, 2000. "note: The nucleolus is not aggregate-monotonic on the domain of convex games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 29(1), pages 133-137.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:29:y:2000:i:1:p:133-137 Note: Received May 1999/Revised version December 1999
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Steven Brams & Peter Fishburn, 2005. "Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 25(2), pages 457-474, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Yanovskaya, E. & Brânzei, R. & Tijs, S.H., 2008. "Monotonicity Problems of Interval Solutions and the Dutta-Ray Solution for Convex Interval Games," Discussion Paper 2008-102, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    2. J. Arin & I. Katsev, 2016. "A monotonic core solution for convex TU games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, pages 1013-1029.
    3. Hougaard, Jens Leth & Østerdal, Lars Peter, 2010. "Monotonicity of social welfare optima," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 392-402, November.
    4. Josep Maria Izquierdo Aznar & Carlos Rafels Pallarola, 2002. "Coalitionally Monotonic Set-solutions for Cooperative TU Games," Working Papers in Economics 75, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
    5. Arin Aguirre, Francisco Javier, 2010. "Monotonic core solutions: Beyond Young's theorem," IKERLANAK 2010-44, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    6. Ehlers, Lars & Klaus, Bettina, 2006. "Efficient priority rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 372-384.
    7. Pedro Calleja & Carles Rafels & Stef Tijs, 2006. "The Aggregate-Monotonic Core," Working Papers 280, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
    8. Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2004. "Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, pages 545-560.
    9. Yair Tauman & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2010. "On (non-) monotonicity of cooperative solutions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 39(1), pages 171-175, March.
    10. J. Arin & V. Feltkamp, 2005. "Monotonicity properties of the nucleolus on the domain of veto balanced games," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, pages 331-341.
    11. Calleja, Pere & Llerena Garrés, Francesc, 2016. "Consistency distinguishes the (weighted) Shapley value, the (weighted) surplus division value and the prenucleolus," Working Papers 2072/266577, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    12. Hans Keiding, 2011. "Maximizing selections from the core of a cooperative game," Journal of Global Optimization, Springer, pages 107-118.
    13. Pedro Calleja & Carles Rafels & Stef Tijs, 2010. "Aggregate monotonic stable single-valued solutions for cooperative games," Working Papers in Economics 237, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.

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    Keywords

    Nucleolus; convex games; aggregate-monotonicity;

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