Maximizing selections from the core of a cooperative game
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Volume (Year): 50 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (May)
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Toru Hokari, 2000. "Population monotonic solutions on convex games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 29(3), pages 327-338.
- David Housman & (*), Lori Clark, 1998. "Note Core and monotonic allocation methods," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 27(4), pages 611-616.
- Toru Hokari, 2000. "note: The nucleolus is not aggregate-monotonic on the domain of convex games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 29(1), pages 133-137.
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