Merging and Splitting in Cooperative Games: Some (Im-)Possibility Results
Solutions for cooperative games with side-payments can be manipulated by merging a coalition of players into a single player, or, conversely, splitting a player into a number of smaller players. This paper establishes some (im-)possibility results concerning merging- or splitting-proofness of core solutions of balanced and convex games.
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