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Disadvantageous syndicates

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  • Postlewaite, Andrew
  • Rosenthal, Robert W.

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  • Postlewaite, Andrew & Rosenthal, Robert W., 1974. "Disadvantageous syndicates," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 324-326, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:9:y:1974:i:3:p:324-326
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. HILDENBRAND, Werner, 1968. "The core of an economy with a measure space of economic agents," LIDAM Reprints CORE 26, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    2. W. Hildenbrand, 1968. "The Core of an Economy with a Measure Space of Economic Agents," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 35(4), pages 443-452.
    3. Shapley, Lloyd S. & Shubik, Martin, 1969. "On market games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 9-25, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. S. Flåm & L. Koutsougeras, 2010. "Private information, transferable utility, and the core," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 42(3), pages 591-609, March.
    2. O. Tejada & M. Álvarez-Mozos, 2016. "Vertical syndication-proof competitive prices in multilateral assignment markets," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 20(4), pages 289-327, December.
    3. Peter Knudsen & Lars Østerdal, 2012. "Merging and splitting in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(4), pages 763-774, November.
    4. O. Tejada and M. Alvarez-Mozos, 2012. "Vertical Syndication-Proof Competitive Prices in Multilateral Markets," Working Papers in Economics 283, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
    5. H. Andrew Michener & Daniel J. Myers, 1998. "Probabilistic Coalition Structure Theories," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 42(6), pages 830-860, December.
    6. H. Michener & Daniel Myers, 1998. "An Empirical Comparison of Probabilistic Coalition Structure Theories in 3-Person Sidepayment Games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 45(1), pages 37-82, August.
    7. María Gómez-Rúa & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2017. "A monotonic and merge-proof rule in minimum cost spanning tree situations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 63(3), pages 813-826, March.
    8. Rodolphe Durand & Robert M. Grant & Tammy L. Madsen & Joshua Gans & Michael D. Ryall, 2017. "Value capture theory: A strategic management review," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(1), pages 17-41, January.
    9. Okuno, Masahiro & Postlewaite, Andrew & Roberts, John, 1980. "Oligopoly and Competition in Large Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(1), pages 22-31, March.
    10. Harborne W. Stuart, 2016. "Value Gaps and Profitability," Strategy Science, INFORMS, vol. 1(1), pages 56-70, March.
    11. Bloch, Francis & Ghosal, Sayantan, 1997. "Stable Trading Structures in Bilateral Oligopolies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 368-384, June.
    12. Adam Brandenburger & Harborne Stuart, 2007. "Biform Games," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 53(4), pages 537-549, April.
    13. Joao Montez & Francisco Ruiz-Aliseda & Michael D. Ryall, 2018. "Competitive Intensity and Its Two-Sided Effect on the Boundaries of Firm Performance," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(6), pages 2716-2733, June.
    14. Trine Tornøe Platz & Lars Peter Østerdal, 2013. "Forming and Dissolving Partnerships in Cooperative Game Situations," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 15(2), pages 208-228, April.

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