An Empirical Comparison of Probabilistic Coalition Structure Theories in 3-Person Sidepayment Games
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Volume (Year): 45 (1998)
Issue (Month): 1 (August)
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- H. Andrew Michener & Greg B. Macheel & Charles G. Depies & Chris A. Bowen, 1986. "Mollifier Representation in Non-Constant-Sum Games," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 30(2), pages 361-382, June.
- Postlewaite, Andrew & Rosenthal, Robert W., 1974.
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 324-326, November.
- Andrew Postlewaite & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1973. "Disadvantageous Syndicates," Discussion Papers 40, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Johansen, Leif, 1982. "Cores, aggressiveness and the breakdown of cooperation in economic games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 1-37, March.
- Charnes, A. & Littlechild, S. C., 1975. "On the formation of unions in n-person games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 386-402, June. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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