IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Stability and Fairness in Models with a Multiple Membership

  • Michel Le Breton

    ()

    (IDEI, Toulouse)

  • Juan D. Moreno-Ternero

    ()

    (Department of Economic Theory, Universidad de Málaga)

  • Alexei Savvateev

    ()

    (New Economic School, Moscow)

  • Shlomo Weber

    ()

    (Southern Methodist University)

This article studies a model of coalition formation for the joint production (and finance) of public projects, in which agents may belong to multiple coalitions. We show that, if projects are divisible, there always exists a stable (secession-proof) structure, i.e., a structure in which no coalition would reject a proposed arrangement. When projects are indivisible, stable allocations may fail to exist and, for those cases, we resort to the least core in order to estimate the degree of instability. We also examine the compatibility of stability and fairness in metric environments with indivisible projects, where we also explore the performance of well-known solutions, such as the Shapley value and the nucleolus.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://webdeptos.uma.es/THEconomica/malagawpseries/Papers/METCwp2010-10.pdf
File Function: First version, 2010
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center in its series Working Papers with number 2010-10.

as
in new window

Length: 44 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mal:wpaper:2010-10
Contact details of provider: Postal: Plaza del Ejido s/n 29071, Málaga
Phone: 952131196
Fax: 952131199
Web page: http://webdeptos.uma.es/THEconomica/malagawpseries/METC.html
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Jeroen Kuipers, 1998. "Bin packing games," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 47(3), pages 499-510, October.
  2. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1973. "Some further results on the measurement of inequality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 188-204, April.
  3. Atkinson, Anthony B., 1970. "On the measurement of inequality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 244-263, September.
  4. Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 2003. "The Art of Making Everybody Happy : How to Prevent a Secession," IDEI Working Papers 164, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  5. Michel Le Breton & Shlomo Weber, 2003. "The Art of Making Everybody Happy: How to Prevent a Secession," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 50(3), pages 4.
  6. Drèze, Jacques & Le Breton, Michel & Savvateev, Alexei & Weber, Shlomo, 2008. ""Almost" subsidy-free spatial pricing in a multi-dimensional setting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 275-291, November.
  7. Bikhchandani, Sushil & Mamer, John W., 1997. "Competitive Equilibrium in an Exchange Economy with Indivisibilities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 385-413, June.
  8. M. L. Balinski, 1965. "Integer Programming: Methods, Uses, Computations," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 12(3), pages 253-313, November.
  9. Aumann, Robert J. & Maschler, Michael, 1985. "Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-213, August.
  10. Bikhchandani, Sushil & Ostroy, Joseph M., 2002. "The Package Assignment Model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 377-406, December.
  11. Green, Jerry & Kohlberg, Elon & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1976. "Partial equilibrium approach to the free-rider problem," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 375-394, November.
  12. Edward Clarke, 1971. "Multipart pricing of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 17-33, September.
  13. Tijs, S.H. & Driessen, T.S.H., 1986. "Extensions of solution concepts by means of multiplicative å-games," Other publications TiSEM cfc61277-a471-446d-b8f0-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  14. Louis Makowski & Joseph M. Ostroy, 2000. "Linear Programming and General Equilibrium Theory," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1673, Econometric Society.
  15. Dasgupta, Partha & Sen, Amartya & Starrett, David, 1973. "Notes on the measurement of inequality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 180-187, April.
  16. ReVelle, C.S. & Eiselt, H.A. & Daskin, M.S., 2008. "A bibliography for some fundamental problem categories in discrete location science," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 184(3), pages 817-848, February.
  17. Montero, Maria, 2006. "Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 380-397, February.
  18. Ulrich Faigle & Walter Kern & Daniël Paulusma, 2000. "Note on the computational complexity of least core concepts for min-cost spanning tree games," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 52(1), pages 23-38, 09.
  19. repec:spr:compst:v:52:y:2000:i:1:p:23-38 is not listed on IDEAS
  20. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521681599 is not listed on IDEAS
  21. Kolen, Antoon, 1983. "Solving covering problems and the uncapacitated plant location problem on trees," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 266-278, March.
  22. repec:spr:compst:v:47:y:1998:i:3:p:499-510 is not listed on IDEAS
  23. Hervé Moulin & Scott Shenker, 2001. "Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs:budget balance versus efficiency," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 511-533.
  24. Kelso, Alexander S, Jr & Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1483-1504, November.
  25. HervÊ Moulin, 1999. "Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 279-320.
  26. Jens Leth Hougaard & Lars Thorlund-Petersen & Bezalel Peleg, 2001. "On the set of Lorenz-maximal imputations in the core of a balanced game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 147-165.
  27. Dutta, Bhaskar & Ray, Debraj, 1989. "A Concept of Egalitarianism under Participation Constraints," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 615-35, May.
  28. Tijs, Stef H. & Driessen, Theo S. H., 1986. "Extensions of solution concepts by means of multiplicative [var epsilon]-tax games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 9-20, August.
  29. Winfried Pohlmeier & Luc Bauwens & David Veredas, 2007. "High frequency financial econometrics. Recent developments," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/136223, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  30. Moulin, Hervé, 2009. "Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 96-119, January.
  31. Javier Arin & Elena Inarra, 2001. "Egalitarian solutions in the core," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 187-193.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mal:wpaper:2010-10. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Samuel Danthine)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.