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Unions’ relative concerns and strikes in wage bargaining

Author

Listed:
  • MAULEON, Ana
  • VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent
  • VERGARI, Cecilia

Abstract

type="main"> We consider a model of wage determination with private information in an oligopoly. We investigate the effects of unions having relative concerns on the negotiated wage and the strike activity. We show that an increase of unions’ relative concerns has an ambiguous effect on the strike activity.
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Suggested Citation

  • MAULEON, Ana & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent & VERGARI, Cecilia, 2014. "Unions’ relative concerns and strikes in wage bargaining," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2633, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:2633
    Note: In : Bulletin of Economic Research, 66(4), 374-383, 2014
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    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Goerke, Laszlo & Neugart, Michael, 2017. "Social comparisons in oligopsony," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 196-209.
    3. Laszlo Goerke & Michael Neugart, 2017. "Social comparisons in Oligopsony," IAAEG Discussion Papers until 2011 201704, Institute of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU).
    4. Kopel, Michael & Petrakis, Emmanuel & Ressi, Anna, 2019. "Endogenous scope of firm-union bargaining with vertical pay comparisons," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 39-52.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • J50 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - General
    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General

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