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Egalitarian solutions in the core

Author

Listed:
  • Javier Arin

    (Universidad Pais Vasco, Fundamentos Analisis Economico, Avenida Lehendakari Aguirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain)

  • Elena Inarra

    (Universidad Pais Vasco, Fundamentos Analisis Economico, Avenida Lehendakari Aguirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain)

Abstract

In this paper we define the Lorenz stable set, a subset of the core consisting of the allocations that are not Lorenz dominated by any other allocation of the core. We introduce the leximin stable allocation, which is derived from the application of the Rawlsian criterion on the core. We also define and axiomatize the egalitarian core, a set of core allocations for which no transfer from a rich player to a poor player is possible without violating the core restrictions. We find an inclusive relation of the leximin stable allocation and of the Lorenz stable set into the egalitarian core.

Suggested Citation

  • Javier Arin & Elena Inarra, 2001. "Egalitarian solutions in the core," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 30(2), pages 187-193.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:30:y:2001:i:2:p:187-193 Note: Received: October 1999/Final version: July 2001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alessandro Lizzeri, 1999. "Budget Deficits and Redistributive Politics," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(4), pages 909-928.
    2. Eddie Dekel & Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 2004. "Vote Buying," Discussion Papers 1386, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
      • Jackson, Matthew O. & Dekel, Eddie & Wolinsky, Asher, 2005. "Vote buying," Working Papers 1215, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
      • Eddie Dekel & Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 2005. "Vote Buying," Others 0503006, EconWPA.
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