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On the set of Lorenz-maximal imputations in the core of a balanced game

  • Jens Leth Hougaard


    (Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Studiestraede 6, 1455 Copenhagen K., Denmark.)

  • Lars Thorlund-Petersen

    (Copenhagen Business School, Department of Operations Management, Solbjerg Pl. 3, 2000 Frederiskberg, DENMARK)

  • Bezalel Peleg

    (Hebrew University Jerusalem, Center Rationality, Interaction, Decision Theory, Givat-Ram, Feldman Building, 91 904 Jerusalem, ISRAEL)

This paper considers the set of Lorenz-maximal imputations in the core of a balanced cooperative game as a solution concept. It is shown that the Lorenz-solution concept satisfies a number of suitable properties such as desirability, continuity and the reduced game property. Moreover, the paper consideres alternative characterizations where it is shown that Lorenz-fairness is tantamount to the existence of an additive, strictly increasing and concave social welfare function. Finally the paper also provides axiomatic characterizations as well as two examples of application.

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Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 30 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 147-165

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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:30:y:2001:i:2:p:147-165
Note: Received: February 1999/Final version: June 2001
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