On the set of Lorenz-maximal imputations in the core of a balanced game
This paper considers the set of Lorenz-maximal imputations in the core of a balanced cooperative game as a solution concept. It is shown that the Lorenz-solution concept satisfies a number of suitable properties such as desirability, continuity and the reduced game property. Moreover, the paper consideres alternative characterizations where it is shown that Lorenz-fairness is tantamount to the existence of an additive, strictly increasing and concave social welfare function. Finally the paper also provides axiomatic characterizations as well as two examples of application.
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Volume (Year): 30 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
|Note:||Received: February 1999/Final version: June 2001|
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