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The Art of Making Everybody Happy : How to Prevent a Secession

  • Le Breton, Michel
  • Weber, Shlomo
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    File URL: http://idei.fr/sites/default/files/medias/doc/wp/2003/making_happy.pdf
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    Paper provided by Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse in its series IDEI Working Papers with number 164.

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    Date of creation: 2003
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    Publication status: Published in IMF Staff Papers, n°01/176, novembre 2001. IMF Staff Papers, vol. 50, 2003, p. 403-435.
    Handle: RePEc:ide:wpaper:569
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    1. Weber, Shlomo & Zamir, Shmuel, 1985. "Proportional taxation: Nonexistence of stable structures in an economy with a public good," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 178-185, February.
    2. Wittman, Donald, 1991. "Nations and States: Mergers and Acquisitions; Dissolutions and Divorce," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 126-29, May.
    3. Alberto Alesina & Enrico Spolaore, 1995. "On the Number and Size of Nations," NBER Working Papers 5050, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Caplin, Andrew & Nalebuff, Barry, 1991. "Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(1), pages 1-23, January.
    5. Paolo Mauro, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712.
    6. Greenberg, Joseph & Weber, Shlomo, 1986. "Strong tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 101-117, February.
    7. Cremer, Helmuth & De Kerchove, Anne-Marie & Thisse, Jacques-Francois, 1985. "An economic theory of public facilities in space," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 249-262, June.
    8. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999. "Political Economics and Public Finance," CEPR Discussion Papers 2235, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. William Easterly & Sergio Rebelo, 1993. "Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth: An Empirical Investigation," NBER Working Papers 4499, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Bordignon, Massimo & Brusco, Sandro, 1999. "Optimal secession rules," ZEW Discussion Papers 99-51, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    11. Bolton, Patrick & Roland, Gerard & Spolaore, Enrico, 1996. "Economic theories of the break-up and integration of nations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 697-705, April.
    12. Wacziarg, Romain & Spolaore, Enrico & Alesina, Alberto, 2000. "Economic Integration and Political Disintegration," Scholarly Articles 4553029, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    13. Guesnerie Roger & Oddou Claude, 1979. "Second best taxation as a game," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 7919, CEPREMAP.
    14. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1996. "Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(3), pages 623-46, May.
    15. Philippe Jehiel & Suzanne Scotchmer, 2001. "Constitutional Rules of Exclusion in Jurisdiction Formation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 68(2), pages 393-413.
    16. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1996. "Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Redistribution," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(5), pages 979-1009, October.
    17. Dapeng Hu & Masahisa Fujita, 2001. "Regional disparity in China 1985-1994: The effects of globalization and economic liberalization," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 35(1), pages 3-37.
    18. Bernd Hayo & Matthias Wrede, 2004. "Fiscal equalisation: Principles and an application to the European Union," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 23(3), pages 333-348, December.
    19. Patrick Bolton & Gérard Roland, 1997. "The Breakup of Nations: A Political Economy Analysis," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1057-1090.
    20. Carlo Perroni & Kimberley A. Scharf, . "Tiebout with Politics: Capital Tax Competition and Constitutional Choices," EPRU Working Paper Series 97-05, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    21. Ehtisham Ahmad & Li Keping & Raju J Singh & Thomas J Richardson, 2002. "Recentralization in China?," IMF Working Papers 02/168, International Monetary Fund.
    22. Feinstein, Jonathan S, 1992. "Public-Good Provision and Political Stability in Europe," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(2), pages 323-29, May.
    23. Shlomo Weber, 1992. "On Hierarchical Spatial Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(2), pages 407-425.
    24. Casella, Alessandra, 1992. "On Markets and Clubs: Economic and Political Integration of Regions with Unequal Productivity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(2), pages 115-21, May.
    25. Wacziarg, Romain & Alesina, Alberto, 1998. "Openness, Country Size and Government," Scholarly Articles 4553014, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    26. Friedman, David, 1977. "A Theory of the Size and Shape of Nations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(1), pages 59-77, February.
    27. Wooders, Myrna, 1978. "Equilibria, the core, and jurisdiction structures in economies with a local public good," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 328-348, August.
    28. Buchanan, James M & Faith, Roger L, 1987. "Secession and the Limits of Taxation: Toward a Theory of Internal Exit," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 1023-31, December.
    29. Alessandra Casella & Jonathan S. Feinstein, 2002. "Public Goods in Trade on the Formation of Markets and Jurisdictions," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(2), pages 437-462, May.
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