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Federalism, Regional Redistribution and Country Stability

In: The Political Economy of Inter-Regional Fiscal Flows

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  • Enrico Spolaore

Abstract

Struggles over what a region receives, or should receive, from the budget of the central government are common to many countries. Discussions often focus on the measures of ‘net fiscal flows’ or ‘fiscal balances’ provided by the government or other actors. This unique book shows just how these flows are computed then interpreted and clarifies the often misunderstood economic and political motives that explain why some regions receive more monies than others.

Suggested Citation

  • Enrico Spolaore, 2010. "Federalism, Regional Redistribution and Country Stability," Chapters, in: Núria Bosch & Marta Espasa & Albert Solé Ollé (ed.), The Political Economy of Inter-Regional Fiscal Flows, chapter 13, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:13466_13
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Enrico Spolaore, 2016. "The economics of political borders," Chapters, in: Eugene Kontorovich & Francesco Parisi (ed.), Economic Analysis of International Law, chapter 1, pages 11-43, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Cerniglia, Floriana & Longaretti, Riccarda & Zanardi, Alberto, 2021. "How to design decentralisation to curb secessionist pressures? Top-down vs. bottom-up reforms," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 377-390.
    4. Tjaša Bjedov & Simon Lapointe & Thierry Madiès & Marie Claire Villeval, 2018. "Does decentralization of decisions increase the stability of large groups?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 51(4), pages 681-716, December.
    5. Vanschoonbeek, Jakob, 2020. "Regional (in)stability in Europe a quantitative model of state fragmentation," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 605-641.
    6. Flamand, Sabine, 2019. "Partial decentralization as a way to prevent secessionist conflict," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 159-178.
    7. Vincent Anesi & Philippe De Donder, 2011. "Voting under the threat of secession: accommodation vs. repression," Working Papers 2011/40, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    8. Vanschoonbeek, Jakob, 2020. "Divided We Stad: a Fiscal Bargaining Model for Divided Countries," MPRA Paper 101863, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Deck, Cary & Foster, Joshua & Song, Hongwei, 2015. "Defense against an opportunistic challenger: Theory and experiments," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 242(2), pages 501-513.
    10. Dima Bogdan & Dima Ştefana Maria, 2016. "Policies for Happiness in the Global Village," Journal of Heterodox Economics, Sciendo, vol. 3(1), pages 17-53, June.
    11. Vincent Anesi & Philippe De Donder, 2011. "Voting under the Threat of Secession: Accommodation vs. Repression," CESifo Working Paper Series 3458, CESifo Group Munich.
    12. Albert Solé-Ollé, 2013. "Inter-regional redistribution through infrastructure investment: tactical or programmatic?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(1), pages 229-252, July.

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