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Economic Integration, International Conflict and Political Unions

  • Enrico Spolaore

    ()

    (Tufts University, Medford (MA - USA))

This article studies the interactions among economic integration, international conflict, and the formation and breakup of political unions. Economic integration reduces the importance of political size, while international conflict increases it. When international conflict reduces economic integration between politically separate units, multiple equilibria are possible. In one equilibrium, political units are small and more open and engage less in conflict, therefore making political size less important. In another equilibrium, the world is formed by larger units, with more conflict and less economic integration

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File URL: http://www.rivistapoliticaeconomica.it/2004/set-ot/Spolaore.pdf
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Article provided by SIPI Spa in its journal Rivista di Politica Economica.

Volume (Year): 94 (2004)
Issue (Month): 5 (September-October)
Pages: 3-50

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Handle: RePEc:rpo:ripoec:v:94:y:2004:i:5:p:3-50
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