IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/mof/journl/ppr008e.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Economic Analysis and International Security

Author

Listed:
  • Martin C. McGuire

    (Professor, University of California, Irvine)

Abstract

As a discipline, all economics contains both normative and positive elements. This essay presents examples of the substance and style of analysis appropriate in each of these components of international security economics. For positive analysis, we have chosen the question of how economic productivity and trade, military technology and strategy, and political economy of governance can combine to determine a country's choice between peaceful trade and investment vs. predation and conquest of others. For normative analysis, we have chosen examination of alternative means a country could employ to shelter itself from trade disruption. While positive advance of the foundations of security will always be valued, perhaps the pendulum is now swinging back to normative concern with how governments might better manage international perils.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin C. McGuire, 2010. "Economic Analysis and International Security," Public Policy Review, Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance Japan, vol. 6(2), pages 313-346, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:mof:journl:ppr008e
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.mof.go.jp/english/pri/publication/pp_review/ppr008/ppr008e.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Arye L. Hillman & Ngo Van Long, 1983. "Pricing and Depletion of an Exhaustible Resource When There is Anticipation of Trade Disruption," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(2), pages 215-233.
    2. Martin C. McGuire, 2000. "Provision for Adversity," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 44(6), pages 730-752, December.
    3. Bhagwati, Jagdish N. & Srinivasan, T. N., 1976. "Optimal trade policy and compensation under endogenous uncertainty: The phenomenon of market disruption," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 317-336, November.
    4. Alberto Alesina & Enrico Spolaore, 1997. "On the Number and Size of Nations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1027-1056.
    5. Albert L. Nichols & Richard J. Zeckhauser, 1977. "Stockpiling Strategies and Cartel Prices," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(1), pages 66-96, Spring.
    6. Enrico Spolaore & Alberto Alesina & Romain Wacziarg, 2000. "Economic Integration and Political Disintegration," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1276-1296, December.
    7. Bergstrom, Clas & Loury, Glenn C & Persson, Mats, 1985. "Embargo Threats and the Management of Emergency Reserves," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(1), pages 26-42, February.
    8. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1992. "Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 720-739, September.
    9. Williams,Jeffrey C. & Wright,Brian D., 2005. "Storage and Commodity Markets," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521023399.
    10. TOSHIHIRO IHORI & MARTIN C. McGUIRE, 2007. "Collective Risk Control and Group Security: The Unexpected Consequences of Differential Risk Aversion," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(2), pages 231-263, April.
    11. Herschel I. Grossman & Juan Mendoza, 2001. "Annexation or Conquest? The Economics of Empire Building," NBER Working Papers 8109, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Patrick Bolton & GĂ©rard Roland, 1997. "The Breakup of Nations: A Political Economy Analysis," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1057-1090.
    13. Philip J. Cook & Daniel A. Graham, 1977. "The Demand for Insurance and Protection: The Case of Irreplaceable Commodities," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 91(1), pages 143-156.
    14. Alesina, Alberto & Spolaore, Enrico, 2005. "War, peace, and the size of countries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(7), pages 1333-1354, July.
    15. Martin McGuire, 2006. "Uncertainty, Risk Aversion, And Optimal Defense Against Interruptions In Supply," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(4), pages 287-309.
    16. Martin C. McGuire, 1967. "The Structure of Choice Between Deterrence and Defense," NBER Chapters,in: Issues in Defense Economics, pages 129-169 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Michelle R. Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas, 2000. "Conflict without Misperceptions or Incomplete Information," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 44(6), pages 793-807, December.
    18. Hirshleifer,Jack, 2001. "The Dark Side of the Force," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521804127, April.
    19. Jack Hirshleifer, 1989. "Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative success," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 63(2), pages 101-112, November.
    20. Thompson, Earl A, 1974. "Taxation and National Defense," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(4), pages 755-782, July/Aug..
    21. Mayer, Wolfgang, 1977. "The national defense tariff argument reconsidered," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 363-377, November.
    22. Garfinkel, Michelle R, 1990. "Arming as a Strategic Investment in a Cooperative Equilibrium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 50-68, March.
    23. Stergios Skaperdas & Constantinos Syropoulos, 2002. "Insecure Property and the Efficiency of Exchange," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(476), pages 133-146, January.
    24. Thompson, Earl A, 1979. "An Economic Basis for the "National Defense Argument" for Aiding Certain Industries," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(1), pages 1-36, February.
    25. Durham, Yvonne & Hirshleifer, Jack & Smith, Vernon L., 2008. "The Paradox of Power," Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, Elsevier.
    26. repec:cup:apsrev:v:87:y:1993:i:01:p:115-132_09 is not listed on IDEAS
    27. Charles H. Anderton, 2000. "An Insecure Economy under Ratio and Logistic Conflict Technologies," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 44(6), pages 823-838, December.
    28. Wittman, Donald, 1991. "Nations and States: Mergers and Acquisitions; Dissolutions and Divorce," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 126-129, May.
    29. Toshihiro Ihori & Martin McGuire, 2010. "National self-insurance and self-protection against adversity: bureaucratic management of security and moral hazard," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 103-122, April.
    30. Martin C McGuire & Gary S Becker, 2006. "Reversal of Misfortune: Parodox in Optimization Across Contingencies," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000001030, David K. Levine.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mof:journl:ppr008e. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Policy Research Institute). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/prigvjp.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.