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Economic Analysis and International Security

  • Martin C. McGuire

    (Professor, University of California, Irvine)

As a discipline, all economics contains both normative and positive elements. This essay presents examples of the substance and style of analysis appropriate in each of these components of international security economics. For positive analysis, we have chosen the question of how economic productivity and trade, military technology and strategy, and political economy of governance can combine to determine a country's choice between peaceful trade and investment vs. predation and conquest of others. For normative analysis, we have chosen examination of alternative means a country could employ to shelter itself from trade disruption. While positive advance of the foundations of security will always be valued, perhaps the pendulum is now swinging back to normative concern with how governments might better manage international perils.

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Article provided by Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance Japan in its journal Public Policy Review.

Volume (Year): 6 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
Pages: 313-346

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Handle: RePEc:mof:journl:ppr008e
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