IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ebl/ecbull/eb-07d70005.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Continuing Conflict and Stalemate: A note

Author

Listed:
  • Raul Caruso

    (Institute of Economic Policy, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore)

Abstract

This note is about the possibility of a stalemate in a continuing conflict. Following the prevailing economic literature on the topic, under some assumptions, the outcome of a conflict can be described in two ways: (i) a predetermined split of the contested output (ii) a winner-take-all contest where the winning agent is capable to grab all the contested stake. By contrast, in reality many disputes do not have a clear or a definite outcome. A stalemate can end the conflict with the result of a draw. To allow for a stalemate some formal modifications to the classical Hirshleifer's model of conflict are needed. In particular, since the cornerstone of the economic literature on conflict is the Contest Success Function the possibility of a stalemate can be captured through a modified form of the CSF as axiomatized by Blavatskyy (2004). When a stalemate can emerge, results show that the scenario exhibits a higher degree of violence.

Suggested Citation

  • Raul Caruso, 2007. "Continuing Conflict and Stalemate: A note," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(17), pages 1-8.
  • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-07d70005
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2007/Volume4/EB-07D70005A.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Raul Caruso, 2004. "A Trade Institution as a Peaceful Institution?," Others 0406003, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 02 May 2005.
    2. Faten Ghosn & Glenn Palmer & Stuart A. Bremer, 2004. "The MID3 Data Set, 1993—2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 21(2), pages 133-154, April.
    3. J. Amegashie, 2006. "A contest success function with a tractable noise parameter," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 126(1), pages 135-144, January.
    4. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1987. "Economic Behaviour in Adversity," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226342825, Aprilie.
    5. Anderton, Charles H & Anderton, Roxane A & Carter, John R, 1999. "Economic Activity in the Shadow of Conflict," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 37(1), pages 166-179, January.
    6. Christian Riis & Derek J. Clark, 1997. "Contest success functions: an extension," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 11(1), pages 201-204.
    7. Hirshleifer,Jack, 2001. "The Dark Side of the Force," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521009171, November.
    8. Charles H. Anderton, 2000. "An Insecure Economy under Ratio and Logistic Conflict Technologies," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 44(6), pages 823-838, December.
    9. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1992. "Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 720-739, September.
    10. Neary, Hugh M, 1997. "Equilibrium Structure in an Economic Model of Conflict," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(3), pages 480-494, July.
    11. Durham, Yvonne & Hirshleifer, Jack & Smith, Vernon L., 2008. "The Paradox of Power," Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, in: Charles R. Plott & Vernon L. Smith (ed.), Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 16, pages 127-137, Elsevier.
    12. Caruso, Raul, 2007. "Conflict and Conflict Managment with Asymmetric Stakes (The Bad-Cop and the Good Cop part II)," MPRA Paper 1438, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Grossman, Herschel I & Kim, Minseong, 1995. "Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1275-1288, December.
    14. Stergios Skaperdas, 1996. "Contest success functions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 283-290.
    15. Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Skaperdas, Stergios, 2007. "Economics of Conflict: An Overview," Handbook of Defense Economics, in: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), Handbook of Defense Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 22, pages 649-709, Elsevier.
    16. Enrico Spolaore, 2004. "Economic Integration, International Conflict and Political Unions," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, vol. 94(5), pages 3-50, September.
    17. Michelle R. Garfinkel, 2004. "On the Stability of Group Formation: Managing the Conflict Within," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 21(1), pages 43-68, February.
    18. Raul Caruso, 2008. "Reciprocity in the shadow of threat," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 55(1), pages 91-111, April.
    19. Dixit, Avinash K, 1987. "Strategic Behavior in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 891-898, December.
    20. Grossman, Herschel I, 1991. "A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 912-921, September.
    21. Jack Hirshleifer, 1989. "Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative success," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 63(2), pages 101-112, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Sakshi Gupta & Ram Singh, 2018. "On Existence and Properties of Pure-strategy Equilibria under Contests," Working papers 288, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    2. Raul Caruso, 2008. "Reciprocity in the shadow of threat," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 55(1), pages 91-111, April.
    3. Caruso, Raul, 2011. "International Relative Prices and Civil Wars in Sub-Saharan Africa. Theory and Evidence over the period (1995-2006)," MPRA Paper 29761, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Hosli Madeleine O. & Hoekstra Anke, 2013. "What Fosters Enduring Peace? An Analysis of Factors Influencing Civil War Resolution," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 19(2), pages 123-155, August.
    5. Lin Scott Y. & Seiglie Carlos, 2014. "Same Evidences, Different Interpretations – A Comparison of the Conflict Index between the Interstate Dyadic Events Data and Militarized Interstate Disputes Data in Peace-Conflict Models," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 20(2), pages 1-26, April.
    6. Caruso, Raul, 2007. "A Tentative Model of Conflict, Appropriation and Production in a two-sector Economy," MPRA Paper 4053, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Raul Caruso, 2012. "Differentials in property Rights in a two-sector economy," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 122(2), pages 257-278.
    8. Caruso Raul, 2011. "On the Nature of Peace Economics," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 1-13, January.
    9. Stauvermann Peter J., 2012. "Accumulation and Growth in the Shadow of Conflicts," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 18(1), pages 1-30, April.
    10. Raul Caruso, 2010. "Butter, Guns And Ice-Cream Theory And Evidence From Sub-Saharan Africa," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(3), pages 269-283.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Caruso Raul, 2006. "Conflict and Conflict Management with Interdependent Instruments and Asymmetric Stakes, (The Good-Cop and the Bad-Cop Game)," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-55, September.
    2. Raul Caruso, 2008. "Reciprocity in the shadow of threat," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 55(1), pages 91-111, April.
    3. Raul Caruso, 2009. "Spesa pubblica e criminalità organizzata in Italia: evidenza empirica su dati Panel nel periodo 1997-2003," Economia & lavoro, Carocci editore, issue 1, pages 1-73.
    4. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2007:i:17:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Raul Caruso, 2012. "Differentials in property Rights in a two-sector economy," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 122(2), pages 257-278.
    6. Zuleta, Hernando & Villaveces, Marta Juanita & Andonova, Veneta, 2013. "Conflict and negotiation in Colombia: Are pre-donations useful?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 105-117.
    7. Raul Caruso, 2006. "A Trade Institution as a Peaceful Institution? A Contribution to Integrative Theory," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 23(1), pages 53-72, February.
    8. Yang-Ming Chang & Zijun Luo, 2017. "Endogenous Destruction In Conflict: Theory And Extensions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(1), pages 479-500, January.
    9. Anderton,Charles H. & Carter,John R., 2009. "Principles of Conflict Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521875578, December.
    10. Hernando Zuleta & Juanita Villaveces, 2008. "Conflict and negotiation: a game theoretical approach," Documentos de Trabajo 005148, Universidad del Rosario.
    11. Martin Wittenberg, 2008. "To Prey Or Not To Prey? Welfare And Individual Losses In A Conflict Model1," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 76(2), pages 239-265, June.
    12. Lacomba, Juan A. & Lagos, Francisco & Reuben, Ernesto & van Winden, Frans, 2014. "On the escalation and de-escalation of conflict," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 40-57.
    13. Raul Caruso, 2010. "Butter, Guns And Ice-Cream Theory And Evidence From Sub-Saharan Africa," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(3), pages 269-283.
    14. Caruso Raul, 2011. "On the Nature of Peace Economics," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 1-13, January.
    15. Hausken, Kjell, 2006. "Jack Hirshleifer: A Nobel Prize left unbestowed," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 251-276, June.
    16. Jia, Hao & Skaperdas, Stergios & Vaidya, Samarth, 2013. "Contest functions: Theoretical foundations and issues in estimation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 211-222.
    17. Gonzalez, Francisco M., 2007. "Effective property rights, conflict and growth," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 127-139, November.
    18. Johannes Münster & Klaas Staal, 2011. "War with Outsiders Makes Peace Inside," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 28(2), pages 91-110, April.
    19. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2011. "The Economics of Destructive Power," Chapters, in: Derek L. Braddon & Keith Hartley (ed.), Handbook on the Economics of Conflict, chapter 5, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    20. Anderton, Charles H. & Carter, John R., 2008. "Vulnerable trade: The dark side of an Edgeworth box," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 422-432, November.
    21. Raul Caruso, 2005. "A Very Simple Model of Conflict with Asymmetric Evaluations and Institutional Constraint," Public Economics 0510011, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Conflict;

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • H5 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-07d70005. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: . General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: John P. Conley (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.