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Contest success functions: an extension

Author

Listed:
  • Christian Riis

    (Foundation for Research in Economics and Business Administration , GaustadallÊen 21, N-0371 Oslo, NORWAY)

  • Derek J. Clark

    (Department of Economics, NFH, University of TromsÛ, N-9037 TromsÛ, NORWAY)

Abstract

This note extends the axiomatic characterization of the "power" success function in fair contests by Skaperdas (1996) to an unfair contest. We show that the results previously obtained are straightforward to generalize; the success function is uniquely characterized by Luce's Choice Axiom (implying independence of irrelevant alternatives) and homogeneity of degree zero.

Suggested Citation

  • Christian Riis & Derek J. Clark, 1997. "Contest success functions: an extension," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 11(1), pages 201-204.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:11:y:1997:i:1:p:201-204
    Note: Received: July 1, 1996; revised version: October 30, 1996
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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