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The Political Economy of Predation

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  • Vahabi,Mehrdad

Abstract

Still in the early stages of development, conflict theory presents a growing interest in understanding the economic costs and benefits of conflicts. In this book, Mehrdad Vahabi analyses one type of conflict in particular: manhunting, or predation, in which a dominant power hunts down its prey and the goal of the prey is to escape and thus survive. This contrasts with traditional warfare, in which two (or more) powers enter into a conflict and the goal is to fight to win domination. The economics of escape casts light on costs and benefits of predatory activities, and explores the impact of violence as an impediment to developing countries with respect to assets structure. This book is unprecedented in its research and thought, and develops a new theory of predation in economics that makes a significant contribution to the field.

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  • Vahabi,Mehrdad, 2015. "The Political Economy of Predation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107133976.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:cbooks:9781107133976
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    7. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2016. "A positive theory of the predatory state," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 168(3), pages 153-175, September.
    8. Bálint Madlovics & Bálint Magyar, 2021. "Post-communist predation: modeling reiderstvo practices in contemporary predatory states," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 187(3), pages 247-273, June.
    9. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2019. "A Review of Rent-seekers, Profits, Wages and Inequality, The Top 20%, 2019 by Peter Mihalyi and Ivan Szelenyi," CEPN Working Papers 2019-07, Centre d'Economie de l'Université de Paris Nord.
    10. Pietri, Antoine, 2015. "« Propriété » ou « possession » : une question de sémantique…ou de paradigme ? [“Property” or “possession”: just a matter of semantics…or paradigm?]," MPRA Paper 67096, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Vahabi, Mehrdad, 2015. "جایگاه سپاه در اقتصاد ایران [The Economic Role of Sepah (The Guardians of Revolution)in the Iranian Economy]," MPRA Paper 68531, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. N/A, 2017. "Books Received (Current as of Summer 2017)," Review of Radical Political Economics, Union for Radical Political Economics, vol. 49(3), pages 501-503, September.
    13. N/A, 2019. "Books Received: (current as of Spring 2019)," Review of Radical Political Economics, Union for Radical Political Economics, vol. 51(1), pages 173-176, March.
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    15. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2018. "The resource curse literature as seen through the appropriability lens: a critical survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 175(3), pages 393-428, June.
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    17. Meina Cai & Jianyong Fan & Chunhui Ye & Qi Zhang, 2021. "Government debt, land financing and distributive justice in China," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 58(11), pages 2329-2347, August.
    18. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2017. "Coercive state, resisting society, political and economic development in Iran," Working Papers hal-01583595, HAL.
    19. N/A, 2018. "Books Received (Current as of Spring 2018)," Review of Radical Political Economics, Union for Radical Political Economics, vol. 50(1), pages 222-224, March.
    20. N/A, 2016. "Books Received (Current as of Winter 2017)," Review of Radical Political Economics, Union for Radical Political Economics, vol. 48(4), pages 685-687, December.
    21. Harris,Colin & Cai,Meina & Murtazashvili,Ilia & Murtazashvili,Jennifer Brick, 2020. "The Origins and Consequences of Property Rights," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108969055.
    22. Vahabi, Mehrdad & Hassani-Mahmooei, Behrooz, 2016. "The role of identity and authority from anarchy to order: Insights from modeling the trajectory of dueling in Europe," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 57-72.
    23. Stefano Dughera & Alain Marciano, 2020. "Altruism, predation and the Samaritan's dilemma," Working Papers hal-02550432, HAL.

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