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A Comparison of Rent-Seeking Models and Economic Models of Conflict

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  • Neary, Hugh M

Abstract

This paper provides a comparative analysis of the basic rent-seeking model and a simple economic model of conflict. Each model is concerned with a game in which players invest resources in pursuit of a prize. The purpose of the analysis is to elucidate structural differences between the two models and to analyze the consequent behavioral differences and equilibrium outcomes in the two cases. A key finding is that, where such comparisons are possible, the conflict model tends to involve greater relative expenditure on wealth-redistribution activities than does the rent-seeking model. Copyright 1997 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Neary, Hugh M, 1997. "A Comparison of Rent-Seeking Models and Economic Models of Conflict," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 93(3-4), pages 373-388, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:93:y:1997:i:3-4:p:373-88
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    Cited by:

    1. Tangerås, Thomas P. & Lagerlöf, Nils-Petter, 2002. "Ethnic Diversity and Civil War," Working Paper Series 589, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    2. Hoffmann, Magnus & Rota-Graziosi, Grégoire, 2012. "Endogenous timing in general rent-seeking and conflict models," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 168-184.
    3. Beard, Rodney, 2007. "Rent seeking, interest groups and environmental lobbying: Cane Farmers versus Great Barrier Reef Protectionists," MPRA Paper 5351, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Carl-Johan Dalgaard & Ola Olsson, 0. "Windfall Gains, Political Economy and Economic Development," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE), vol. 17(suppl_1), pages -109.
    5. Jean-Paul Azam, 2006. "The Paradox of Power Reconsidered: A Theory of Political Regimes in Africa," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE), vol. 15(1), pages 26-58, March.
    6. Caruso Raul, 2006. "Conflict and Conflict Management with Interdependent Instruments and Asymmetric Stakes, (The Good-Cop and the Bad-Cop Game)," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-55, September.
    7. repec:gok:ijdcv1:v:7:y:2017:i:2:p:65-80 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Jean-Paul Azam, 2005. "Suicide-bombing as inter-generational investment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 122(1), pages 177-198, January.
    9. Münster, Johannes, 2004. "Simultaneous inter- and intra-group conflicts," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 4, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    10. Katharina Wick & Erwin Bulte, 2006. "Contesting resources – rent seeking, conflict and the natural resource curse," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 128(3), pages 457-476, September.
    11. Cramer, C., 2002. "Homo Economicus Goes to War: Methodological Individualism, Rational Choice and the Political Economy of War," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 30(11), pages 1845-1864, November.
    12. repec:cai:repdal:redp_273_0307 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Welsch, Heinz, 2008. "Resource abundance and internal armed conflict: Types of natural resources and the incidence of 'new wars'," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(3), pages 503-513, October.
    14. Azam, Jean-Paul, 2003. "Beyond the Good and the Evil: Anarchy, Commitment, and Peace," IDEI Working Papers 195, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    15. Olsson, Ola, 2007. "Conflict diamonds," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 267-286, March.
    16. Horatiu Rus, 2014. "Corruption, conflict and the management of natural resources," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 355-386, November.
    17. Kevin Siqueira, 2003. "Conflict and third-party intervention," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(6), pages 389-400.
    18. Lacomba, Juan A. & Lagos, Francisco & Reuben, Ernesto & van Winden, Frans, 2014. "On the escalation and de-escalation of conflict," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 40-57.
    19. Azam, Jean-Paul & Mesnard, Alice, 2003. "Civil War and the Social Contract," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 115(3-4), pages 455-475, June.
    20. Fausto, Cavalli & Mario, Gilli & Ahmad, Naimzada, 2017. "A New Approach to Contest Models," Working Papers 364, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised 03 Mar 2017.

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