IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Appropriation, violent enforcement, and transaction costs: a critical survey

  • Mehrdad Vahabi

    ()

In this paper, I focus on the extension of transaction costs to appropriative activity and coercive power in the property rights approach. It has been argued that including the costs of appropriation and violent enforcement in transaction costs is based on the assumption that Coaseian bargaining can be extended to any institutional scenario, i.e., voluntary as well as coercive exchange. However, voluntary transactions cannot capture the logic of coercive power. This means that the assumption of an efficient political market is not valid, and that the "Political Coase Theorem" (PCT) lacks the logical consistency to provide a cornerstone for political theory.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-010-9721-7
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 147 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 227-253

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:147:y:2011:i:1:p:227-253
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Ngo Long & Gerhard Sorger, 2006. "Insecure property rights and growth: the role of appropriation costs, wealth effects, and heterogeneity," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 513-529, 08.
  2. Smith, Adam, 1776. "An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations," History of Economic Thought Books, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, number smith1776.
  3. Bingyuang Hsiung, 2003. "Reconciling Coase and Buchanan on the Coase Theorem," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, T├╝bingen, vol. 159(2), pages 392-, June.
  4. James E. Anderson & Douglas Marcouiller, 2005. "Anarchy And Autarky: Endogenous Predation As A Barrier To Trade," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 46(1), pages 189-213, 02.
  5. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2010. "Integrating social conflict into economic theory," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 34(4), pages 687-708.
  6. Williamson, Oliver E., 1992. "Markets, hierarchies, and the modern corporation: An unfolding perspective," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 335-352, May.
  7. Wallis, John Joseph & North, Douglass C., 1988. "Should Transaction Costs be Subtracted from Gross National Product?," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(03), pages 651-654, September.
  8. Douglass C. North, 1990. "A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 2(4), pages 355-367, October.
  9. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2009. "A Critical Review of Strategic Conflict Theory and Socio-political Instability Models," Post-Print hal-00629129, HAL.
  10. Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter & Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard, 2003. " Rational Bandits: Plunder, Public Goods, and the Vikings," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 117(3-4), pages 255-72, December.
  11. James E. Anderson & Douglas Marcouiller, 2002. "Insecurity And The Pattern Of Trade: An Empirical Investigation," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 84(2), pages 342-352, May.
  12. Tornell, Aaron & Velasco, Andes, 1992. "The Tragedy of the Commons and Economic Growth: Why Does Capital Flow from Poor to Rich Countries?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(6), pages 1208-31, December.
  13. Acemoglu, Daron, 2003. "Why not a political Coase theorem? Social conflict, commitment, and politics," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 620-652, December.
  14. Christodoulos Stefanadis, 2010. "Appropriation, Property Rights Institutions, and International Trade," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 148-72, November.
  15. Barzel, Yoram, 1974. "A Theory of Rationing by Waiting," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(1), pages 73-95, April.
  16. Bush, Winston C. & Mayer, Lawrence S., 1974. "Some implications of anarchy for the distribution of property," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 401-412, August.
  17. Bingyuan Hsiung, 2004. "Coase Theorem and the Taiwan Strait Conflict," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(4), pages 505-518, November.
  18. Alchian, Armen A & Woodward, Susan L, 1988. "The Firm is Dead; Long Live the Firm: A Review of Oliver E. Williamson's The Economic Institutions of Capitalism," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 26(1), pages 65-79, March.
  19. Benjamin Powell & Edward Stringham, 2009. "Public choice and the economic analysis of anarchy: a survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(3), pages 503-538, September.
  20. Berggren, Niclas & Karlson, Nils, 2003. " Constitutionalism, Division of Power and Transaction Costs," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 117(1-2), pages 99-124, October.
  21. Dixit, Avinash & Olson, Mancur, 2000. "Does voluntary participation undermine the Coase Theorem?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 309-335, June.
  22. Stigler, George J, 1992. "Law or Economics?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(2), pages 455-68, October.
  23. Powell, Benjamin & Wilson, Bart J., 2008. "An experimental investigation of Hobbesian jungles," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 66(3-4), pages 669-686, June.
  24. Stergios Skaperdas & Constantinos Syropoulos, 2002. "Insecure Property and the Efficiency of Exchange," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(476), pages 133-146, January.
  25. Philip R. Lane & Aaron Tornell, 1999. "The Voracity Effect," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 22-46, March.
  26. Barzel, Yoram, 1977. "An Economic Analysis of Slavery," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(1), pages 87-110, April.
  27. Cheung, Steven N S, 1970. "The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-exclusive Resource," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(1), pages 49-70, April.
  28. Vahabi, Mehrdad, 2008. "From Walrasian general equilibrium to incomplete contracts : making sense of institutions," MPRA Paper 37887, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2002.
  29. Barzel, Yoram, 1982. "Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(1), pages 27-48, April.
  30. Schlicht, Ekkehart, 1996. "Exploiting the Coase Mechanism: The Extortion Problem," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(3), pages 319-30.
  31. Demsetz, Harold, 1988. "The Theory of the Firm Revisited," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 141-61, Spring.
  32. Bryan Caplan, 2005. "From Friedman to Wittman: The Transformation of Chicago Political Economy," Econ Journal Watch, Econ Journal Watch, vol. 2(1), pages 1-21, April.
  33. Kenneth Arrow, 1962. "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention," NBER Chapters, in: The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, pages 609-626 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  34. Bowles Samuel & Jayadev Arjun, 2007. "Garrison America," The Economists' Voice, De Gruyter, vol. 4(2), pages 1-7, April.
  35. Jayadev, Arjun & Bowles, Samuel, 2006. "Guard labor," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 328-348, April.
  36. Wittman, Donald, 1989. "Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1395-1424, December.
  37. Smith, Adam, 2008. "An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations: A Selected Edition," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199535927 edited by Sutherland, Kathryn.
  38. Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Skaperdas, Stergios, 2007. "Economics of Conflict: An Overview," Handbook of Defense Economics, Elsevier.
  39. Barzel,Yoram, 1997. "Economic Analysis of Property Rights," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521597135.
  40. Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August.
  41. Thompson, Earl A & Faith, Roger L, 1981. "A Pure Theory of Strategic Behavior and Social Institutions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 366-80, June.
  42. Coase, Ronald H., 1991. "The Institutional Structure of Production," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 1991-1, Nobel Prize Committee.
  43. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2009. "An Introduction to Destructive Coordination," Post-Print hal-00629124, HAL.
  44. Schlicht, Ekkehart, 1997. "The Coase Mechanism and the Iteration Argument: Reply," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(4), pages 581-85.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:147:y:2011:i:1:p:227-253. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)

or (Christopher F. Baum)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.