Soft budget constraint and the parastatal sector
This paper explores the relevance of soft budget constraints (SBC) to development studies by examining the parastatal sector. The political ingredient of the SBC is discussed by focusing on two examples: 1) religious and military foundations in Iran; and 2) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. It presents two main findings. First, the SBC of the parastatal sector can be understood as the political economy of a predator state or state’s rent-seeking activity. Second, the state sector is more prone to the SBC compared with a decentralized competitive market, but it might be subject to a harder budget constraint in comparison with the parastatal sector.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2011|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Mehrdad Vahabi, 2011.
"Appropriation, violent enforcement and transaction costs : a critical survey,"
- Mehrdad Vahabi, 2011. "Appropriation, violent enforcement, and transaction costs: a critical survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(1), pages 227-253, April.
- Kornai, Janos, 1986.
"The Soft Budget Constraint,"
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(1), pages 3-30.
- Vahabi, Mehrdad, 2006.
"Ordres contradictoires et coordination destructive: le malaise iranien
[Contradictory orders and detructive coordination: the Iranian disease]," MPRA Paper 13235, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Sep 2008.
- Mehrdad Vahabi, 2010. "Ordres contradictoires et coordination destructive : Le malaise iranien," Post-Print hal-00629134, HAL.
- Mehrdad Vahabi, 2014. "Soft Budget Constraint Reconsidered," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(1), pages 1-19, 01.
- Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2000.
"Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 115(4), pages 1167-1199.
- Acemoglu, Daron & Robinson, James A, 1998. "Why did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality and Growth in Historical Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 1797, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- János Kornai & Eric Maskin & Gérard Roland, 2003.
"Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint,"
Journal of Economic Literature,
American Economic Association, vol. 41(4), pages 1095-1136, December.
- J. Kornai & E. Maskin & G. Roland., 2004. "Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 12.
- J. Kornai & E. Maskin & G. Roland., 2004. "Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 11.
- Kornai, J, 1979. "Resource-Constrained versus Demand-Constrained Systems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(4), pages 801-19, July.
- Kornai, Janos, 2001. "Hardening the budget constraint: The experience of the post-socialist countries," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(9), pages 1573-1599, October.
- Kornai, Janos, 1992. "The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198287766, June.
- Kornai, Janos & Weibull, Jorgen W., 1983. "Paternalism, buyers' and sellers' market," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 153-169, November.
- Guriev, Sergei & Makarov, Igor & Maurel, Mathilde, 2002.
"Debt Overhang and Barter in Russia,"
Journal of Comparative Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 635-656, December.
- Sergei Guriev & Igor Makarov & Mathilde Maurel, 2000. "Debt Overhang and Barter in Russia," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 339, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
- Guriev, Sergei & Makarov, Igor & Maurel, Mathilde, 2001. "Debt Overhang and Barter in Russia," CEPR Discussion Papers 2686, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Sergei Guriev & Igor Makarov & Mathilde Maurel, 2002. "Debt Overhang and Barter in Russia," Post-Print halshs-00468633, HAL.
- Roger Congleton, 2009. "On the political economy of the financial crisis and bailout of 2008–2009," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(3), pages 287-317, September.
- Li, David D., 1998. "Insider control and the soft budget constraint: a simple theory," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 307-311, December.
- Scott, Chris, 1990. "Soft Budgets and Hard Rents: A Note," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 117-27.
- David E. Wildasin, 2001.
"Externalities and Bailouts: Hard and Soft Budget Constraints in Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations,"
- Wildasin, David E., 1997. "Externalities and bailouts : hard and soft budget constraints in intergovernmental fiscal relations," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1843, The World Bank.
- Mehrdad Vahabi & Mohajer Nasser, 2011. "Islamic republic of Iran and Its Opposition," Post-Print hal-00629139, HAL.
- Desai, Raj M. & Olofsgard, Anders, 2006. "The political advantage of soft budget constraints," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 370-387, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:37926. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joachim Winter)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.