IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ksa/szemle/1493.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Bevezetés A puha költségvetési korlát című kötethez
[Introduction to the author s volume entitled Soft Budget Constraint]

Author

Listed:
  • Kornai, János

    ()

Abstract

A puha költségvetési korlát gondolatának első felvetése óta eltelt négy évtizedben sokat haladt előre a probléma megértése. Vitatkozva azokkal, akik csupán a veszteséges szocialista vállalatok kimentésére szűkítenék le a jelenség értelmezését, a tanulmány rámutat arra, hogy sokféle szervezetben és formában, a gazdaság sok szférájában felléphet a szindróma, s pénzügyi baj esetén sokféle eszközt használhatnak kimentésre. Egy-egy kimentési akció önmagában még nem hozza létre a puha költségvetési korlát szindrómáját, ez akkor bontakozik ki, ha a kimentés beépül a várakozásokba. Különös figyelmet kívánnak azok a motívumok, amelyek kiváltják a jelenséget mind a kimentett, mind a kimentő szervezetben. A tanulmány helyzetjelentést ad a szindróma elterjedtségéről a szocialista és kaptalista rendszer különböző periódusaiban, illetve különböző szektoraiban. A szerző kifejti álláspontját normatív kérdésekben, hozzászól a káros hatások ellen fellépő terápiához. Először a valóságos gyakorlattal foglalkozik, majd kijelöli a puha költségvetési korláttal kapcsolatos elmélet helyét az eszmék és modellek világában. Bemutatja, hogyan viszonyul más elméleti irányzatokhoz, többek között az intézményi és viselkedési közgazdaságtanhoz, az erkölcsi kockázat és az időbeli következetlenség elméleteihez. Számot ad arról, mennyire terjedt el a puha költségvetési korlát gondolkodási apparátusa a szakirodalomban; hol tart a közgazdászszakma általi "kanonizálása". Végül áttekinti a főbb kutatási feladatokat. Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kód: B52, D03, D21, H2, P51.

Suggested Citation

  • Kornai, János, 2014. "Bevezetés A puha költségvetési korlát című kötethez
    [Introduction to the author s volume entitled Soft Budget Constraint]
    ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(7), pages 845-897.
  • Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:1493
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.kszemle.hu/tartalom/letoltes.php?id=1493
    Download Restriction: Registration and subscription. 3-month embargo period to non-subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dietrichson, Jens & Ellegård, Lina Maria, 2015. "Assist or desist? Conditional bailouts and fiscal discipline in local governments," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 153-168.
    2. Jean-Michel Josselin & Fabio Padovano & Yvon Rocaboy, 2013. "Grant legislation vs. political factors as determinants of soft budget spending behaviors. Comparison between Italian and French regions," European Journal of Comparative Economics, Cattaneo University (LIUC), vol. 10(3), pages 317-354, December.
    3. Pun, Wing-chung, 1995. "The Kornai Effect and Soft Budget Constraints," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 326-335, December.
    4. Patrick Bolton & Mathias Dewatripont, 2005. "Contract Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262025760, May.
    5. Ernesto Crivelli & Adam Leive & Thomas Stratmann, 2010. "Subnational Health Spending and Soft Budget Constraints in OECD Countries," IMF Working Papers 10/147, International Monetary Fund.
    6. Qian, Yingyi & Roland, Gerard, 1998. "Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1143-1162, December.
    7. Timothy Goodspeed, 2002. "Bailouts in a Federation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 9(4), pages 409-421, August.
    8. Goldfeld, Stephen M. & Quandt, Richard E., 1988. "Budget constraints, bailouts, and the firm under central planning," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 502-520, December.
    9. M. Dewatripont & E. Maskin, 1995. "Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and Decentralized Economies," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 62(4), pages 541-555.
    10. Eggleston, Karen & Shen, Yu-Chu, 2011. "Soft budget constraints and ownership: Empirical evidence from US hospitals," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 7-11, January.
    11. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2014. "This Time is Different: A Panoramic View of Eight Centuries of Financial Crises," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 15(2), pages 1065-1188, November.
    12. Ben-Bassat, Avi & Dahan, Momi & Klor, Esteban F., 2016. "Is centralization a solution to the soft budget constraint problem?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 57-75.
    13. Anderson, James H. & Korsun, Georges & Murrell, Peter, 2000. "Which Enterprises (Believe They) Have Soft Budgets? Evidence on the Effects of Ownership and Decentralization in Mongolia," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 219-246, June.
    14. Marian Rizov & Jan Pokrivcak & Pavel Ciaian, 2013. "CAP Subsidies and Productivity of the EU Farms," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(3), pages 537-557, September.
    15. Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, 1997. "Federalism as a Commitment to Reserving Market Incentives," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 83-92, Fall.
    16. Thushyanthan Baskaran & Zohal Hessami, 2017. "Monetary integration, soft budget constraints, and the EMU sovereign debt crises," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(3), pages 252-275, November.
    17. Magee, Karen L & Quandt, Richard E, 1994. "The Kornai Effect with Partial Bailouts and Taxes," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 27-38.
    18. Robinson, James A. & Torvik, Ragnar, 2009. "A political economy theory of the soft budget constraint," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(7), pages 786-798, October.
    19. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2009. "Varieties of Crises and Their Dates," Introductory Chapters,in: This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly Princeton University Press.
    20. Baskaran, Thushyanthan, 2012. "Soft budget constraints and strategic interactions in subnational borrowing: Evidence from the German States, 1975–2005," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 114-127.
    21. Chenggang Xu, 2011. "The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 49(4), pages 1076-1151, December.
    22. Svensson, Jakob, 2000. "When is foreign aid policy credible? Aid dependence and conditionality," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 61-84, February.
    23. Jin, Hehui & Qian, Yingyi & Weingast, Barry R., 2005. "Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives: Federalism, Chinese style," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1719-1742, September.
    24. Goldfeld, Stephen M. & Quandt, Richard E., 1990. "Output targets, the soft budget constraint and the firm under central planning," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 205-222, October.
    25. Schaffer, Mark E., 1989. "The credible-commitment problem in the center-enterprise relationship," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 359-382, September.
    26. Kornai, János & Maskin, Eric & Roland, Gérard, 2004. "A puha költségvetési korlát I
      [The soft budget constraint I]
      ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(7), pages 608-624.
    27. Vahabi, Mehrdad, 2011. "Soft budget constraint and the parastatal sector," MPRA Paper 37926, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    28. Karolina Kaiser & Emmanuelle Taugourdeau, 2013. "The timing of elections in federations: a disciplining device against soft budget constraints?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 154(3), pages 197-215, March.
    29. Lubomír Lízal & Jan Svejnar, 2002. "Investment, Credit Rationing, And The Soft Budget Constraint: Evidence From Czech Panel Data," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 84(2), pages 353-370, May.
    30. Lindbeck, Assar & Weibull, Jorgen W, 1988. "Altruism and Time Consistency: The Economics of Fait Accompli," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(6), pages 1165-1182, December.
    31. Yingyi Qian & Chenggang Xu, 1998. "Innovation and Bureaucracy Under Soft and Hard Budget Constraints," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 65(1), pages 151-164.
    32. Alexander Fink & Thomas Stratmann, 2011. "Institutionalized Bailouts and Fiscal Policy: Consequences of Soft Budget Constraints," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(3), pages 366-395, August.
    33. Desai, Raj M. & Olofsgard, Anders, 2006. "The political advantage of soft budget constraints," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 370-387, June.
    34. Lars P. Feld & Alexander Kalb & Marc-Daniel Moessinger & Steffen Osterloh, 2013. "Sovereign Bond Market Reactions to Fiscal Rules and No-Bailout Clauses - The Swiss Experience," CESifo Working Paper Series 4195, CESifo Group Munich.
    35. Werner De Bondt, 2010. "The crisis of 2008 and financial reform," Qualitative Research in Financial Markets, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 2(3), pages 137-156, October.
    36. Chang, Ha-Joon, 2000. "The Hazard of Moral Hazard: Untangling the Asian Crisis," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 775-788, April.
    37. Mykhayliv, Dariya & Zauner, Klaus G., 2013. "Investment behavior and ownership structures in Ukraine: Soft budget constraints, government ownership and private benefits of control," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 265-278.
    38. Kurt R. Brekke & Luigi Siciliani & Odd Rune Straume, 2015. "Hospital Competition with Soft Budgets," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 117(3), pages 1019-1048, July.
    39. Per Pettersson-Lidbom, 2010. "Dynamic Commitment and the Soft Budget Constraint: An Empirical Test," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 2(3), pages 154-179, August.
    40. Bordignon, Massimo & Turati, Gilberto, 2009. "Bailing out expectations and public health expenditure," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 305-321, March.
    41. Kornai, János, 2000. "A költségvetési korlát megkeményítése a posztszocialista országokban
      [Hardening of the budget constraint in the post-socialist countries]
      ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(1), pages 1-22.
    42. Goldfeld, Stephen M. & Quandt, Richard E., 1993. "Uncertainty, bailouts, and the Kornai effect," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 113-119.
    43. Kornai, János, 2008. "A puha költségvetési korlát szindrómája a kórházi szektorban
      [The soft budget constraint syndrome in the hospital sector]
      ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(12), pages 1037-1056.
    44. Li, Lixing, 2008. "Employment burden, government ownership and soft budget constraints: Evidence from a Chinese enterprise survey," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 215-229, June.
    45. Jonathan A. Rodden & Gunnar S. Eskeland (ed.), 2003. "Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262182297, May.
    46. Thorsten Janus, 2009. "Aid and the Soft Budget Constraint," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(2), pages 264-275, May.
    47. Asim Ijaz Khwaja & Atif Mian, 2005. "Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 120(4), pages 1371-1411.
    48. Chow, Clement K.W. & Song, Frank M. & Wong, Kit Pong, 2010. "Investment and the soft budget constraint in China," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 219-227, April.
    49. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
    50. Bergstrom, Theodore C, 1989. "A Fresh Look at the Rotten Kid Theorem--and Other Household Mysteries," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(5), pages 1138-1159, October.
    51. Wladimir Andreff, 2011. "Some comparative economics of the organization of sports: competition and regulation in north American vs. European professional team sports leagues," European Journal of Comparative Economics, Cattaneo University (LIUC), vol. 8(1), pages 3-27, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Győrffy, Dóra, 2014. "Kornai János: A puha költségvetési korlát. Kornai János válogatott munkái, IV. kötet. Kalligram Kiadó, Pozsony, 2014, 383 o
      [János Kornai: A puha költségvetési korlát (The soft budget constraint).
      ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(12), pages 1467-1475.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • P51 - Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:1493. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Odon Sok). General contact details of provider: http://www.kszemle.hu .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.