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Fiscal Federalism in Russia: Soft Budget Constraints of Regional Governments

Author

Listed:
  • Sergey Sinelnikov

    (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy)

  • Pavel Kadochnikov

    (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy)

  • Ilya Trunin

    (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy)

  • Sergey Chetverikov

    (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy)

  • Marianne Vigneault

Abstract

The study has reviewed the experience of foreign countries in the sphere of implementation of respective measures designed to prevent the emergence of soft budget constraints imposed on subnational authorities in a situation of fiscal decentralization. Also, a number of theoretic simulation models have been built and analyzed that describe the interactions arising between the central government and regional authorities while specific variants of budget policy are being selected. Certain hypotheses concerning the existence of soft budget constraints in the regions of the Russian Federation are empirically tested.

Suggested Citation

  • Sergey Sinelnikov & Pavel Kadochnikov & Ilya Trunin & Sergey Chetverikov & Marianne Vigneault, 2006. "Fiscal Federalism in Russia: Soft Budget Constraints of Regional Governments," Published Papers 47, Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, revised 2012.
  • Handle: RePEc:gai:ppaper:47
    as

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    File URL: http://www.iep.ru/files/RePEc/gai/ppaper/47Sinelnikov.pdf
    File Function: Revised version, 2012
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. J. Kornai & E. Maskin & G. Roland., 2004. "Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 12.
    2. Walliser, Jan & Winter, Joachim, 1998. "Tax incentives, bequest motives and the demand for life insurance : evidence from Germany," Papers 99-28, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
    3. Schaffer, Mark E., 1989. "The credible-commitment problem in the center-enterprise relationship," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 359-382, September.
    4. McGuire, Martin, 1978. "A method for estimating the effect of a subsidy on the receiver's resource constraint: with an application to U.S. local governments 1964-1971," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 25-44, August.
    5. Bradford, David F & Oates, Wallace E, 1971. "Towards a Predictive Theory of Intergovernmental Grants," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(2), pages 440-448, May.
    6. Logan, Robert R, 1986. "Fiscal Illusion and the Grantor Government," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(6), pages 1304-1318, December.
    7. Robert P. Inman, 1989. "The Local Decision to Tax: Evidence from Large U.S. Cities," NBER Working Papers 2921, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Poterba, James M., 1995. "Balanced Budget Rules and Fiscal Policy: Evidence From the States," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 48(3), pages 329-36, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    fiscal federalism; soft budget constraints; Russian economy;

    JEL classification:

    • H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
    • H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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