IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Fiscal Federalism in Russia: Soft Budget Constraints of Regional Governments

Listed author(s):
  • Sergey Sinelnikov

    (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy)

  • Pavel Kadochnikov

    (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy)

  • Ilya Trunin

    (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy)

  • Sergey Chetverikov

    (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy)

  • Marianne Vigneault

The study has reviewed the experience of foreign countries in the sphere of implementation of respective measures designed to prevent the emergence of soft budget constraints imposed on subnational authorities in a situation of fiscal decentralization. Also, a number of theoretic simulation models have been built and analyzed that describe the interactions arising between the central government and regional authorities while specific variants of budget policy are being selected. Certain hypotheses concerning the existence of soft budget constraints in the regions of the Russian Federation are empirically tested.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.iep.ru/files/RePEc/gai/ppaper/47Sinelnikov.pdf
File Function: Revised version, 2012
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy in its series Published Papers with number 47.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision: 2012
Handle: RePEc:gai:ppaper:47
Contact details of provider: Postal:
3-5 Gazetny lane, Moscow, 125009

Phone: (495) 629-6413
Fax: (495) 203-8816
Web page: http://iep.ru/en.html
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as
in new window


  1. McGuire, Martin, 1978. "A method for estimating the effect of a subsidy on the receiver's resource constraint: with an application to U.S. local governments 1964-1971," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 25-44, August.
  2. J. Kornai & E. Maskin & G. Roland., 2004. "Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 12.
  3. Walliser, Jan & Winter, Joachim, 1998. "Tax incentives, bequest motives and the demand for life insurance : evidence from Germany," Papers 99-28, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
  4. Bradford, David F & Oates, Wallace E, 1971. "Towards a Predictive Theory of Intergovernmental Grants," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(2), pages 440-448, May.
  5. Logan, Robert R, 1986. "Fiscal Illusion and the Grantor Government," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(6), pages 1304-1318, December.
  6. Robert P. Inman, 1989. "The Local Decision to Tax: Evidence from Large U.S. Cities," NBER Working Papers 2921, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Schaffer, Mark E., 1989. "The credible-commitment problem in the center-enterprise relationship," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 359-382, September.
  8. Poterba, James M., 1995. "Balanced Budget Rules and Fiscal Policy: Evidence From the States," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 48(3), pages 329-36, September.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gai:ppaper:47. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Victor Hugues)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.